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CHALLENGE TO THE DECISIONMAKING
PROCESS-FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE606(b) AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A
FAIR TRIAL
by
Peter N. Thompson *
INCE Lord Mansfield's day courts have jealously guarded the secrecy
of jury deliberations by a competency rule limiting juror testimony on
post-trial motions for new trial. Although courts cite the interest in
juror privacy--encouraging free and robust debate and avoiding juror har-
assment-as justification for the rule, the primary concern is to ensure the
finality of jury verdicts. Recent studies,I as well as published opinions, doc-
ument the obvious, that lay jurors frequently discuss improper matters in the
jury room and base their decisions in part on improper considerations.
Thus, too close a look at jury deliberations will reveal improprieties in a
large number of cases, damaging the finality and public acceptance of jury
verdicts.
The proper role of the lay jury in resolving litigation has evoked constant
controversy and concern. 2 The omission of explicit recognition of the right
to jury trial spurred the debate leading to the Bill of Rights3 and nearly
* B.A., DePauw University; J.D.; University of Michigan. Professor of Law, Hamline
University.
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1. See P. LERMACK, MATERIALS ON JURIES AND JURY RESEARCH: AN ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
2. Much of the controversy results from concern over jurors' ability to deal efficiently
and effectively with the complexity of modern litigation. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Anti-
trust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1079 (3d Cir. 1980); In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d
411, 427-31 (9th Cir. 1979); Decker, The Right to Trial by Jury: Old English Law Supports a
Complexity Exception to the Seventh Amendment, 11 SETON HALL L. REV. 31, 40-43, 45-52
(1980); Devitt, Should Jury Trial Be Required in Civil Cases? A Challenge to the Seventh
Amendment, 47 J. AIR L. & CoM. 495, 497-500 (1982); Dittman, The Right to Triaj by Jury in
Complex Civil Litigation, 55 TUL. L. REv. 491, 498-500 (1981); Jorde, The Seventh Amend-
ment Right to Jury Trial of Antitrust Issues, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2-5 (1981).
3. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV.
639, 662 (1973); see also A. HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST 611-26 (1880); 2 M. FARRAND,
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frustrated the ratification of the Constitution. 4 The institution of the jury is
now prominently preserved in the Constitution, 5 and the jury has become a
central feature in the American system of justice. Along with the flag and
the American eagle, the jury system is a revered symbol of the American
way of life to such an extent that to question the jury system or to engage in
activity that might alter its function can be deemed "un-American" and can
precipitate investigation by a United States Senate subcommittee concerned
with internal security. 6 Belief in the value of trial by jury takes on mystical,
if not religious, tones7 that remain universally shared by most Americans.
The exalted status of the jury clouds reasoned debate about the propriety
of particular aspects of jury practice. Courts avoid close scrutiny of juror
deliberations by using Mansfield's arbitrary rule that jurors are incompetent
to give evidence to impeach their verdict.8 The rule is codified in part by
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and reflects a policy judgment that the in-
terest in accurate and rational decisionmaking is subservient to the interest
of finality. Lord Mansfield's rule, therefore, is consistent with the view that
the constitutional right to jury trial represents a commitment to democratic
decisionmaking and not necessarily a commitment to finding the truth.
Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court, however, cast sub-
stantial doubt on the validity of the evidentiary rule. First, the Court has
recognized that the accused's constitutional rights extend to the decision-
making process of the jury.9 Second, the Supreme Court has recently fo-
cused on the impact of alleged error on the decision by the jury as a primary
concern in appellate review, encouraging post-trial interrogation of jurors.10
This outcome-oriented approach is used both in deciding whether alleged
THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 587 (1913) (debates in the federalist convention); Hen-
derson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289, 293 (1966).
4. A. HAMILTON, supra note 3, at 614; J. ELLIOTT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 544 (2d ed.
1836); Henderson, supra note 3, at 295; Wolfram, supra note 3, at 667.
5. Jury trial rights are specifically protected by U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, & amends. VI
& VII.
6. See Hearings on Recording of Jury Deliberations Before the Subcomm. to Investigate
the Administration of the Internal Security Act of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) (investigation in response to tape recording of several jury deliberations
in actual trials as part of jury project conducted by the University of Chicago Law School).
7. An early Second Circuit decision described the jury process as follows:
The general verdict is as inscrutable and essentially mysterious as the judgment
which issued from the ancient oracle of Delphi. Both stand on the same founda-
tion-a presumption of wisdom. The court protects the jury from all investiga-
tion and inquiry as fully as the temple authorities protected the priestess who
spoke to the supplient [sic] votary at the shrine.
Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1948); see also 1 W. HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 317 (7th ed. 1956) (when jury system first introduced in Eng-
land, jury verdicts were considered to have inscrutability of judgments of God).
8. Vaise v. Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944, 944 (K.B. 1785). Congress has also impeded
inquiry into the deliberation process. After the hearings referred to supra note 6, Congress
passed 18 U.S.C. § 1508, precluding tape-recording of jury deliberations. 18 U.S.C. § 1508
(1982) (current version).
9. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966).
10. Rushen v. Spain, 104 S. Ct. 453, 456-57, 78 L. Ed. 2d 267, 273-74 (1983); Smith v.
Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 212-18 (1982).
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error amounts to constitutional error"' and in an expanded application of
the harmless error analysis.12 The Court has required post-trial hearings to
ascertain, as a factual matter, whether a particular juror was improperly in-
fluenced by the alleged error. 13 Consequently, how and why jurors react in
general, as well as how the jurors acted in the particular case, become the
focus of post-trial and appellate litigation. This approach reflects a view of
the jury as an organ of truth, but substantially undermines the policy inter-
ests underlying the evidentiary rule purportedly limiting such testimony.
The Court must reconcile its approach to post-trial review of error in
criminal cases with the underlying policy giving rise to Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 606(b). The reconciliation must begin with an analysis of the jury trial
rights as guaranteed by the Constitution and a clear view of whether the
central purpose of the institution of the American jury is a search for truth
or an exercise in democratic decisionmaking.
I. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE JURY
The jury is an ancient, yet continually evolving, institution. Its origins can
be traced to the ancient Greeks and Egyptians, 14 but the Germanic inquisi-
tion introduced into England by the Norman Conquest is credited as the
precursor of the modem jury.' 5 Although now viewed as a populist institu-
tion of liberty, the jury was originally a tool of the royalty.' 6 A judge ap-
pointed by the king would select members of the community, presumably
those familiar with the facts involved in the controversy. The jurors would
promise to answer truthfully questions interposed. The king used the inqui-
sition to inventory land for taxing purposes in preparation of the Doomesday
Book in about 1080. At the discretion of the king the inquest could be used
in other matters as well. It was used to resolve title to property and the
king's litigation, and the king lent it to private parties to resolve disputes.
The inquisition jurors, usually twelve in number, were in effect witnesses. 17
In a rural society with sparse population, official acts and business were con-
ducted in public. Everybody knew everyone's business. The jurors, there-
fore, relied on their personal knowledge about the case.' 8 If necessary the
11. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).
12. Rushen v. Spain, 104 S. Ct. 453, 455-56, 78 L. Ed. 2d 267, 273 (1983).
13. Rushen v. Spain, 104 S. Ct. 453, 78 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1983); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S.
209 (1982).
14. See W. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 7, 12-13 (1852); L. MOORE, THE
JURY, TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 1-4 (1973).
15. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 303; F. MAITLAND & F. MONTAGUE, A
SKETCH OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 51-58 (1915); J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE
ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 47 (1898). But cf Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct.,
104 S. Ct. 819, 822, 78 L. Ed. 2d 629, 635 (1984) (origin of public trial in England precedes
Norman Conquest).
16. Early commentators explained the origins of the jury trial as follows: "[T]rial by jury
was rather French than English, rather royal than popular, rather the livery of conquest than a
badge of freedom." F. MAITLAND & F. MONTAGUE, supra note 15, at 46.
17. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 312-13, 317.
18. F. MAITLAND & F. MONTAGUE, supra note 15, at 56-58; 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 15, at 317-19.
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early jury was empowered to conduct an investigation to develop facts. 19 As
society evolved and became more complex, the role of the jury changed to
the more modem concept of impartial arbiters of the facts, and witnesses
provided the evidence for resolution by jurors.
As trial by ordeal and compurgation died out, trial by jury emerged as the
predominant institution for resolving disputes.20 The jury flourished in Eng-
land even as its use diminished in other parts of the continent. 21 A jury trial
looms as one of the important rights guaranteed by the Magna Carta and
was firmly entrenched in the English justice system during the colonization
of America. When King James I granted the Virginia Charter in 1606, the
Charter guaranteed the right to trial by jury. The Virginia Charter set a
pattern for the governance of the other colonies in North America.22
Although the general shape of the jury trial right varied substantially in
England and among the various colonies, the basic right to a trial by one's
peers, which might be limited to landowning peers, was an important right
to the colonists. The failure to include a provision for jury trial in civil cases
caused considerable concern in the debates about the adoption of the
Constitution. 23
The jury trial has flourished as an institution in the United States, while its
use in England has diminished. 24 Despite its popular appeal, the jury system
is frequently criticized. 25 The system is cumbersome, expensive, and unpre-
19. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.2 (2d ed. 1977).
20. J. THAYER, supra note 15, at 69.
21. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 315-17.
22. Hyman & Tarrant, Aspects of American Trial Jury History, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN
AMERICA 24-26 (R. Simon ed. 1975).
23. L. MOORE, supra note 14, at 105-06; Henderson, supra note 3, at 295; Hyman &
Tarrant, supra note 22, at 31; Wolfram, supra note 3, at 657.
24. The deemphasis of the civil jury trial in England was instigated by three parliamen-
tary acts: The Judicature Acts of 1873-75, the Juries Act of 1918, and the Emergency Provi-
sions Act of 1939. Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue." Civil Juries and the Allocation of
JudicialPower, 56 TEX. L. REV. 47, 51 (1977); see W. CORNISH, THE JURY 76 (1968); Holtz-
off, Modern Trends in Trial by Jury, 16 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 27, 38 (1959). The Judicature
Acts of 1873-75 allowed parties to waive a jury and the court to dispense with a jury in chan-
cery cases and in more complex cases. The Juries Act of 1918 was enacted in response to the
manpower shortage created by World War I. This act dismissed the use of juries except in
cases of fraud, libel, slander, false imprisonment, seduction, malicious prosecution, breach of
promise to marry, divorce, or probate. Finally, the Emergency Provisions Act, passed in re-
sponse to a manpower shortage created by World War II, virtually abolished the civil jury
trial. Nokes, The English Jury and the Law of Evidence, 31 TUL. L. REV. 153, 155-58 (1956).
In 1955 only 49 of the 70,000 civil cases tri,-d were tried to a jury. Id. at 159-60. By 1958 the
proportion of jury trials represented two percent of all trials. Haines, The Disappearance of
Civil Juries in England, Canada and Australia, 4 DEF. L.J. 118, 119 (1958). Expense is an
important factor in the decline of the jury in England. Id. at 120; Higginbotham, supra, at 55-
56. Contingent fees are illegal; thus, the parties bear the cost of litigation. Trial by judges
reduces the cost and is, as a result, the favored procedure. Id.; Holtzoff, supra, at 38. In
addition, the English jury lacks constitutional protection. Higginbotham, supra, at 50-51. The
Parliament, through the various acts noted above, had the power to restrict or abolish the jury.
The judiciary is granted very little judicial review, so it is considerably less active politically
than the American judiciary. The jury, therefore, is not needed as a democraticizing force to
encourage public acceptance of acts of judicial review. Id. at 52, 59-60.
25. Criticism of the jury system is not a new phenomemon. See, e.g., Dead, Trial by Jury,
17 AM. L. REV. 398, 399-400 (1883), in which the author stated:
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dictable; all of these factors tend to encourage litigation. Furthermore, com-
plicated issues of modem society do not easily lend themselves to resolution
by lay persons in an adversary proceeding. The ability to adapt the institu-
tion of the jury to accommodate changes in modern society is impaired by
the Supreme Court's decision in Dimick v. Schiedt.26 The Court in Dimick
held that the jury trial rights provided in the Bill of Rights must be mea-
sured by the scope of the jury trial in England in 1791,27 the year of the
enactment of the Bill of Rights. 28
The Court has countenanced some change in the historic functioning of
the jury. For example, the Supreme Court has recently addressed state inno-
vations relating to the constitutional requirements for jury size29 and una-
nimity30 of jury verdicts. Furthermore, litigants are asking the courts to
address numerous other issues concerning the makeup and functioning of
the jury.
Part of the reason that the institution of the jury is controversial is the
varied and diverse expectations of what the institution encompasses. What
began as a tool, used by the state to carry out accurately and efficiently the
laws imposed on the people, has evolved into a protector of the people and a
check against governmental tyranny. The concept of the jury as an institu-
tion designed and dedicated to the truth and the efficient effectuation of the
laws is at odds with the historic driving force behind the institution of the
jury in the United States. Community sense of justice, not truth, was the
primary concern of our forefathers. The main concerns about the inclusion
of a right to jury trial in the Constitution stemmed not from a fear that the
judiciary would inaccurately enforce the law, but more from a hope that a
lay jury might choose not to enforce the law if the law were unjust or of-
fended the local community sense of justice. 3' Along with a distrust of
power, economic self-interest may have been a major motivation for institut-
ing the right to trial by jury in civil cases. A period of rapid deflation,
spurred by a reduction in paper money, followed the Revolutionary War,
leaving a number of patriots in substantial debt. Many hoped that local ju-
rors would be more sympathetic to local debtors when the foreign creditors
Still in these days of progress and experiment, when everything is on trial at the
bar of human reason or conceit, it is quite the fashion to speak of jury trial as
something that has outlived its usefulness. Intelligent and well-meaning people
often sneer at it as an awkward and useless impediment to the speedy and cor-
rect administration of justice, and a convenient loop-hole for the escape of pow-
erful and popular rogues. Considering the kind of jury trials we sometimes have
in the United States, it must be admitted that this criticism is not without
foundation.
26. 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
27. Id. at 487.
28. Wolfram, supra note 3, at 639-44.
29. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
30. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404
(1972); see also Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 139 (1979) (conviction by six-person jury for
nonpetty offenses held to violate sixth and fourteenth amendments when jury verdict is not
unanimous).
31. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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came to collect. 32
The jury today is revered as an institution that dispenses community jus-
tice on an ad hoc basis. Its greatest moment is frequently said to have oc-
curred at the trial of John P. Zenger, when the jury steadfastly refused to
convict the patriot journalist in clear violation of the court's instruction as to
the applicable law.33 On the other hand, the strong social interest in truth,
consistency, and uniformity cannot be ignored. These conflicting policies
have produced a constant struggle between the jury trial viewed as a process
for dispensing community justice and as an institution for rational, objective,
and predictable decisionmaking. The conflict is frequently "between the
people's aspirations for democratic government, and the judiciary's desire
for the orderly supervision of public affairs by judges." 34
The judiciary's struggle to control the jury is as old as the jury system. In
the original jury trials, if jurors violated their oaths to return a true verdict,
they could be tried for something akin to perjury. A writ of attaint could be
issued, and the jurors would be tried by a second and larger jury of twenty-
four. If they were convicted, the jurors could lose their property and serve a
year in prison. Even after the writ of attaint fell into disuse, petit jurors
could be fined or imprisoned for bringing in improper verdicts, particularly
if the jury "improperly" acquitted a criminal defendant. 35 In the sixteenth
century the Star Chamber exercised control over juries and punished jurors
when verdicts were contrary to the weight of the evidence. 36 This practice
was not ended until 1670, when the famous Bushell's Case37 was decided.
The court in Bushell's Case reasoned that jurors were judges of the facts; if
they were required to find the facts as advocated by the judge, a jury was
unnecessary. 38 Only if the jurors acted dishonestly or corruptly should they
be subject to sanction. The writ of attaint, although infrequently used, was
an appropriate check on dishonest jurors. Although the writ of attaint was
abolished in 1825, 39 an occasional juror still is prosecuted for perjury or
contempt of court.40 Nonetheless, the struggle to keep jury verdicts within
acceptable bounds continues.
Other, more traditional methods for addressing perceived inaccuracy in
jury verdicts include orders for new trial, judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, and remittitur.4 1 Numerous devices are imposed prior to verdict to
32. Wolfram, supra note 3, at 675-76.
33. See J. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER
ZENGER (1963); L. RUTHERFORD, JOHN PETER ZENGER (1970).
34. Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582, 615 (1939).
35. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 341-43; J. THAYER, supra note 15, at 138.
36. Bushell's Case, Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670); see I W. HOLDS-
WORTH, supra note 7, at 343-47; T. PLUCKNET, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
134 (5th ed. 1956).
37. Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
38. Id.
39. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 342.
40. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933); see also Rushen v. Spain, 104 S. Ct. 453,
455-56, 78 L. Ed. 2d 267, 273-74 (1983).
41. For a general discussion of remedial measures employed by courts to correct jury
error, see F. JAMES, supra note 19.
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assist the jury in reaching the court's view of the correct and accurate result.
These now traditional means for controlling the jury range from the use of
burdens of proof, presumptions, instructions, and comments, to the more
intrusive directed verdicts. Furthermore, the exclusionary rules of evidence
have evolved in an effort to limit the jurors' exposure to matters that might
mislead them in their deliberations.
The interest in accuracy and predictability is substantial and frequently in
conflict with the concept of ad hoc community justice. The disparate views
of the proper functioning of the jury create a schizophrenia of sorts, result-
ing in conflicting and irreconcilable decisions by the courts. For example,
the jury is revered as a democratic institution independently dispensing jus-
tice, disregarding the mandates of unfair laws, and serving as a check against
overzealous prosecutors or biased judges. Jurors, however, are required to
swear an oath to uphold the law and are usually not informed of their his-
toric role and the power of nullification. 42 Although the United States
Supreme Court has recognized the traditional role of the jury as a check on
governmental tyranny, recent decisions suggest a trend focusing on truth
and accuracy as the predominant considerations in evaluating the role of the
jury.43
In Duncan v. Louisiana" the Court elaborated on the purpose of the jury
trial in criminal cases, stating that "[p]roviding an accused with the right to
be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or ec-
centric judge."' 45 The Court acknowledged the criticism that juries cannot
adequately understand evidence or determine fact issues and that "they are
unpredictable, quixotic, and little better than a roll of dice." 46 The Court
responded by citing studies indicating that jurors do understand the evidence
and come to sound conclusions. The Court further stated that when the
jurors come to a different conclusion from the conclusion reached by the
trial judge, this difference can be explained by the jury's serving the very
purposes for which it was created.47 Accuracy and truth are presumably
secondary considerations. Recent decisions, however, indicate a greater con-
cern for the quality or accuracy of the decision.
An example of the Court's progress toward truth and accuracy as a pri-
mary concern of proper jury functioning is revealed in the series of cases
42. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113
(D.C. Cir. 1972). One court stated: "Any arguably salutary function served by inexplicable
jury acquittals would be lost if that prerogative were frequently exercised ....... United
States v. Washington, 704 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (emphasis in original).
43. See Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
44. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The Court in Duncan determined that trial by jury in a criminal
case is fundamental to the American scheme of justice and is guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment to criminal defendants in state courts. Id. at 149.
45. Id. at 156.
46. Id. at 157.
47. Id. The court was referring to the exercise of juror nullification, in which jurors disre-
gard the applicable law if its application would be unjust.
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addressing jury size and unanimity. In Williams v. Florida4 8 the Court de-
termined that Florida's use of a six-person jury did not violate the constitu-
tional guarantee of a trial by jury. The Court noted that the fundamental
purpose of the jury trial is the prevention of governmental oppression. 49 A
jury, the court stated, is interposed between the accused and the accuser to
provide commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, who determine guilt
or innocence 5° and thereby ensure a verdict based on community participa-
tion and shared responsibility. The Court concluded that these goals can be
achieved through a six-member jury and, almost as an afterthought added
that the jury's reliability as a factfinder is not likely to be influenced by its
size. 5 1
In Apodaca v. Oregon52 the Court held that nonunanimous verdicts do not
impair the right to jury trial because unanimity does not materially contrib-
ute to the exercise of the jury's common sense judgment. As long as the jury
consists of a cross-section of the community with a duty and the opportunity
to deliberate and the jury is free from outside attempts at intimidation, then
the judgment of the jury is valid. 53 The Court recognized that nonunanimity
would produce convictions when juries would otherwise be hung, but it
found this difference in result insignificant from a constitutional
perspective. 54
By 1977, however, the Supreme Court became increasingly concerned
with the accuracy and reliability of the jury as a factfinder. In Ballew v.
Georgia,55 an obscenity trial, the defendant challenged a state court convic-
tion returned by a five-person jury. In determining that five-person juries are
unconstitutional, the Court focused on the accuracy of five-person juries. 56
The Court listed its concerns as follows:
(1) Empirical studies indicate that smaller juries impede effective
group deliberation, lead to inaccurate factfinding, and incorrectly
apply the common sense of the community.
(2) The data raises doubts about the accuracy of results by smaller
panels.
(3) Fewer hung juries would result, and this change would inure to
the benefit of the state and to the detriment of the defendant.
(4) The smaller panel would reduce minority participation on the
panel.
(5) Different-sized panels might reach different results in a small per-
centage of cases, but nationwide this percentage constitutes a large
number of cases. 57
Based on these concerns, the Court concluded that "any further reduction
48. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
49. Id. at 100.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 100-01.
52. 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
53. Id. at 410-11.
54. Id. at 411.
55. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
56. Id. at 245.
57. Id. at 232-37.
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that promotes inaccurate and possibly biased decisionmaking, that causes
untoward differences in verdicts, and that prevents juries from truly repre-
senting their communities, attains constitutional significance." 58
The thrust of the Court's opinion in Ballew centered on the accuracy of
factfinding, the accuracy in representing community values, the accuracy in
result, and the consistency in result of the five-person jury. The greater con-
cern for accuracy in Ballew was a response to the great outpouring of data
and studies stimulated by the Williams decision. 59 The concern could also
be explained by the first amendment implications of the Ballew obscenity
trial. The risk of inaccurate factfinding and inconsistent obscenity prosecu-
tions could have a substantial chilling effect on free speech. In any event, the
Court's conception of the jury as an institution dedicated simply to checking
arbitrary or oppressive government action is expanded. The concern for ac-
curacy in factfinding, accuracy in the application of community judgment,
and predictability and reliability are now highlighted in the Court's concept
of the proper role for the American jury.
The heightened concern for truth and accuracy as a basic ingredient of the
jury function is apparent in Brown v. Louisiana,6° in which the Court deter-
mined whether Burch v. Louisiana6l should be given retroactive effect. The
court in Burch held that nonunanimous six-person jury verdicts are uncon-
stitutional in serious criminal offenses.62 In Brown Justice Brennan con-
cluded that the Burch decision implicated aspects of the "fairness of the
trial-the very integrity of the fact-finding process." 63 The purpose of a trial
is to determine truth, and since the jury has been entrusted with the respon-
sibility for determining truth in serious criminal cases, any practice that
would prevent the jury from performing that function poses a threat to the
truth-determining process. 64  Applying the standard of Linkletter v.
Walker,65 the Court held that Burch should be given retroactive effect. 66
II. JUROR MISCONDUCT
Perhaps the greatest area of conflict between the view of the jury as an
institution dispensing community justice on an ad hoc basis, as opposed to
an organ of truth, arises in post-trial challenges to a verdict based on juror
misconduct or impropriety. Litigants seeking post-trial relief because of ju-
ror misconduct or other impropriety in the decisionmaking process put sub-
stantial strain on the ability to accommodate principles of fairness and
justice with the interest in the efficient workings of our adversary system. If
58. Id. at 239.
59. See id. at 231 n.10 and authorities cited therein.
60. 447 U.S. 323 (1980).
61. 441 U.S. 130 (1979).
62. Id. at 139.
63. 447 U.S. at 334 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965)).
64. 447 U.S. at 334 (citing Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966)).
65. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
66. 447 U.S. at 334. The decision is particularly interesting because the Court previously
had refused to treat Duncan v. Louisiana retroactively in DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631
(1968). See 447 U.S. at 334, 335 n.13.
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the trial process is viewed simply as a check on governmental tyranny, this
goal is fulfilled by giving lay jurors some leeway in deciding a case free from
undue governmental or outside coercion. The manner in which jurors actu-
ally decide the case should be of little concern.
On the other hand, objective, rational decisionmaking is the cornerstone
of procedural due process and equal protection under the laws of the United
States. Notice, the opportunity to be heard 67 by a tribunal unbiased in fact
and appearance, 68 and a decision rationally based on the evidence, and fre-
quently on specific required findings of fact, 69 must be accorded to individu-
als who have had their lives or property affected by the decision.
Furthermore, our society places a high value on open proceedings subject to
public scrutiny. 70 Secrecy and arbitrary decisionmaking is antithetical to our
due process society, yet ironically secrecy 7I and arbitrary decisionmaking 72
is thought to be essential for the operation of the American jury. 73
Frequently the accommodation between these competing interests is
avoided by limiting access to proof of jury room deliberations. For example,
many different types of juror misconduct would justify overturning a jury
verdict, but the parties are limited by local or federal rules in the type of
evidence that they can use to establish the misconduct. Much of the litiga-
tion in this area, therefore, is limited to procedural concerns about the extent
to which jurors can testify about their actions. The more substantive ques-
tions relating to the proper functioning of the jury are not addressed. By not
permitting a litigant to develop the proof that the verdict was improperly
rendered, the accommodation is made in favor of jury autonomy at the ex-
pense of truth or rational decisionmaking.
The threshold decision limiting juror testimony is the English case of
Vaise v. Delaval.74 In Vaise juror affidavits were offered to prove that the
67. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 169 (1961); see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
333 (1976); Eisen v. Carlilse & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 174 (1974); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Sniadach v. Fam-
ily Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965).
68. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472
(1965); Irvin v. Doud, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955);
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531 (1927).
69. E.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation case); Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (alleged unconstitutional termination of employment);
see FED. R. Civ. P. 52; FED R. CRIM. P. 23(a).
70. Chief Justice Burger once stated: "People in an open society do not demand infallibil-
ity from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from
observing." Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980); see also Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S. Ct. 819, 822, 78 L. Ed. 2d 629, 635 (1984) (juror
selection a presumptively public process).
71. Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1948).
72. For example, when jurors return inconsistent verdicts no remedy is provided. The
assumption is that the jurors exercised their nullification power. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 147 (1967); 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 514 (Criminal
2d 1982) and cases cited therein.
73. Compare In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1982) (court could not
limit journalists from post-verdict interviews), with United States v. Davila, 704 F.2d 749 (5th
Cir. 1983) (court could limit litigant's post-verdict juror interviews).
74. 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
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jurors "being divided in their opinion, tossed up ' 75 to determine the winner
of the suit. Lord Mansfield stated:
The Court cannot receive such an affidavit from any of the jurymen
themselves, in all of whom such conduct is a very high misdemeanor,
but in every such case the Court must derive their knowledge from
some other source: such as from some person having seen the transac-
tion through a window, or by some such other means.76
Although the decision was contrary to English precedent and based on the
outdated concept that a witness should not be permitted to allege personal
turpitude, 77 it has been seized upon by American courts as the basis for
authority in limiting post-trial juror testimony. 78
American courts justify limiting jury testimony on the grounds that limi-
tation is necessary to maintain finality of jury verdicts and to avoid harass-
ing, intimidating, or tampering with jurors. Such a restriction also protects
the privacy and confidentiality of jury deliberations, which ensures free ex-
change of ideas and finality of the jury decision.79 Wigmore offers an addi-
tional justification. 80 He maintains that "[t]he verdict of a jury is an
operative act, like a will or a contract or a judgment, and the parol evidence
rules govern . ... "81 Consequently, the verdict is the act of legal signifi-
cance; the thought processes, motives, or beliefs of individual jurors are im-
material considerations. 82 Jurors can neither contradict nor explain the
verdict. Only if the jurors violate essential forms of behavior in arriving at
the verdict 83 or the verdict incorrectly represents the assent of all the jurors
can the verdict be challenged. 84
The Supreme Court has struggled with the extent to which juror testi-
mony or affidavit can be used on a motion for new trial. In United States v.
Reid85 two jurors submitted affidavits stating that they had improperly read
newspaper accounts of the proceedings. In speaking for the Court, Justice
Taney refused to establish a clear rule to deal with the problem and urged a
case-by-case analysis. Without deciding whether the affidavits should be ad-
missible, the Court considered the impact of the alleged misconduct on the
jury verdict. Relying in part on a sworn statement from one of the jurors
that the papers did not have the slightest influence on his verdict, the Court
concluded that even if the affidavits were credited, they would be insufficient
to justify a new trial.86
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2352 (McNaughton rev.
1961).
78. Id.
79. See Carlson & Sumberg, Attacking Jury Verdicts: Paradigms for Rule Revision, 1977
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 247, 250-53; FED. R. EVID. 606(b) advisory committee note.
80. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 77, § 2345.
81. Id.
82. Id. §§ 2349-50.
83. Id. §§ 2352-54.
84. Id. §§ 2355-56.




The same issue was raised again in 1892 in the sensational murder trial of
Clyde Mattox. 87 After his conviction the defendant offered juror affidavits
stating that during the deliberations the bailiff had remarked to the jurors
that "this was the third fellow he [defendant] has killed,"' 88 and that a news-
paper account of the trial was introduced in the jury room. 89 After discuss-
ing Reid the Court concluded that the public policy that forbids the
impeachment of jury verdicts by the affidavits, depositions, or sworn state-
ments of jurors may in the interest of justice create an exception to its own
rule, but great caution must be used in such situations. 90
The Court reviewed what it perceived to be a recognized distinction be-
tween what may and what may not be established by juror testimony. The
Court quoted from Perry v. Bailey91 as follows:
Public policy forbids that a matter resting in the personal conscious-
ness of one juror should be received to overthrow the verdict, because
being personal it is not accessible to other testimony; it gives to the
secret thought of one the power to disturb the expressed conclusions of
twelve; its tendency is to produce bad faith on the part of a minority, to
induce an apparent acquiescence with the purpose of subsequent dis-
sent; to induce tampering with individual jurors subsequent to the ver-
dict. But as to overt acts, they are accessible to the knowledge of all the
jurors.9 2
Apparently without recognizing a conflict, the Court also embraced the ap-
proach taken by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Woodward v. Leavitt93
and stated:
[O]n a motion for a new trial on the ground of bias on the part of one of
the jurors, the evidence of jurors as to the motives and influences which
affected their deliberations, is inadmissible either to impeach or to sup-
port the verdict. But a juryman may testify to any facts bearing upon
the question of the existence of any extraneous influence, although not
as to how far that influence operated upon his mind.94
The Perry rationale distinguishes between acts that are observed and subject
to corroboration by other jurors and matters privately perceived by only one
juror. The Woodward quotation focuses on whether the testimony will re-
veal thought processes and deliberations. Under both of these views the affi-
davits in Mattox were admissible to impeach the verdict.
The Court further elaborated on the evidentiary value of these affidavits.
"Private communications, possibly prejudicial, between jurors and third per-
sons, or witnesses, or the officer in charge, are absolutely forbidden, and
invalidate the verdict, at least unless their harmlessness is made to ap-
87. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892).
88. Id. at 142.
89. Id. at 142-43.
90. Id. at 148.
91. 12 Kan. 539, 545 (1874).
92. 146 U.S. at 148 (quoting Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539, 545 (1874)).
93. 107 Mass. 453 (1871).
94. 146 U.S. at 149 (quoting Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453, 453 (1871)).
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pear."'95 The affidavits, therefore, were admissible and established a prima
facie case for reversal. The court concluded that the information was not
harmless and required a new trial.96 The Mattox Court also noted that the
affidavits did not include statements from the jurors indicating the extent to
which they were influenced by the communications. This type of statement
would be improper under either of the rules cited by the Court.
Without discussion, the Court in Hyde v. United States97 adopted the
Perry rule as the proper approach. The Court stated that jurors' testimony
should not be allowed to prove matters that inhere in the verdict and depend
solely on the jurors' testimony. 98 Ostensibly applying the rule, the Court
rejected affidavits indicating that the jurors entered into a compromise when
some jurors agreed to vote guilty for one codefendant if the others jurors
would vote innocent for another. The convicted defendant had also argued
that the trial judge coerced the jurors into reaching the verdict. The extent
to which the judge coerced individual jurors is a matter that inheres in the
verdict. If the jurors reached a verdict by improper agreement, however, the
agreement is not a private matter resting "in the personal consciousness of
one juror." Such an agreement is an act that could be corroborated and
testified to by a number of jurors; thus the Court appears to misapply the
stated rule.
In McDonald v. Pless99 the Court again confronted the issue of the extent
to which juror misconduct can be established by the testimony or affidavits
of jurors. In McDonald the defendant moved to set aside the decision on the
ground that the jury reached a quotient verdict.' °0 At the hearing on the
motion one of the jurors was sworn as a witness, but the trial court refused
to permit him to testify. In affirming the lower court, the Supreme Court
agreed that if the juror misconduct, a quotient verdict, could be established
by competent evidence, the defendant would be entitled to a new trial. 10 1
The Court reasoned, however, that the lesser of two evils would be to ex-
clude the evidence.10 2 The Court stated that to allow verdicts to be set aside
by the testimony of participating jurors would cause all verdicts to be evalu-
95. 146 U.S. at 150.
96. Id. at 151. This holding by the Court was an alternative one. The Court also deter-
mined that a new trial was required because of the improper exclusion of exculpatory evidence.
97. 225 U.S. 347 (1912).
98. Id. at 384. The Court purported to rely on Gottlieb Bros. v. Jaspar & Co., 27 Kan.
770 (1882), and Wright v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866).
99. 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
100. A quotient verdict is a decision wherein the verdict is arrived at by dividing by twelve
the sum total of each juror's estimate of what the verdict should be. For a further discussion of
quotient verdicts, see 70 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 1135 (1975).
101. 238 U.S. at 267.
102. Id. The McDonald Court further stated:
When the affidavit of a juror, as to the misconduct of himself or the other mem-
bers of the jury, is made the basis of a motion for a new trial the court must
choose between redressing the injury of the private litigant and inflicting the
public injury which would result if jurors were permitted to testify as to what
had happened in the jury room.
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ated to discover jury misconduct. 103 Because of this result,
[j]urors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort
to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct
sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus
used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private
deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation-to the de-
struction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference.104
The Court was again reluctant to adopt a single rule and recognized that
instances may arise in which testimony of the juror could not be excluded
without "violating the plainest principles of justice."' 105 The public interest
in finality in litigation, avoidance of jury harassment and tampering, and
maintenance of the confidentiality of juror deliberation outweighed the liti-
gant's interest to have this case properly decided by the jury. The Court
distinguished the case in which the juror testimony is used to impeach a
verdict from the situation in which juror evidence is supplied to prosecute
jurors for misconduct. In the latter case only the juror privilege would limit
evidence of the happenings in the jury room, and this privilege can be
waived. 106
The scope of the juror privilege was the issue in Clark v. United States.10 7
In Clark the lone juror who held out for acquittal in a criminal prosecution
was charged with contempt for not fully answering questions on voir dire
about her previous employment with the defendant and for stating on voir
dire that she was unbiased, when in fact the evidence indicated that she was
not. Juror discussions and votes were admitted to establish the misconduct,
and the Court discussed whether it could properly rely on this information.
The Court noted that the issue is different from the cases limiting evidence to
impeach verdicts and does not implicate the issues raised in Bushell's
Case,108 which established the independence of jurors to disagree with the
trial judge. The Court concluded that the substantial need for privacy of
juror deliberations must yield to "the overmastering need, so vital in our
polity, of preserving trial by jury in its purity against the inroads of corrup-
tion."' 1 9 The Court distinguished misconduct on voir dire from misconduct
during deliberations, 10 although both issues implicate the concern for pri-
vacy of jury deliberations."'I When the issue involves lying on voir dire, as
opposed to subsequent juror misconduct, the balance is tipped in favor of
disclosing the evidence to ascertain the facts. This distinction cannot be ex-
plained by any concern for the accuracy of the final decision. Misconduct on
103. Id. at 267-68.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 269.
106. Id.
107. 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
108. Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
109. 289 U.S. at 16.
110. Id. at 18.
111. The Court argued that the threat of revealing juror communications evidencing crimi-
nal conduct woi1d not chill the free debate among jurors of "integrity and reasonable firm-
ness." Id. at 16.
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voir dire as well as misconduct during deliberations could have a similar
impact on the outcome of the litigation and the accuracy of the decision.
In Remmer v. United States' 12 the Court again addressed the question of
jury misconduct. During the trial an unidentified individual attempted to
bribe the jury foreman, who in turn, reported the improper contact to the
trial judge. The judge informed the prosecuting attorney, and the FBI con-
ducted an investigation. The trial judge decided that no further action was
necessary. The defendant discovered the incident after he was convicted and
moved for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing.
The United States Supreme Court held that the trial judge committed error
in handling the matter ex parte and remanded the matter to the trial judge to
determine whether the contact constituted harmless error. 113
On remand the trial judge considered only the impact of the FBI investi-
gation and concluded that the investigation was entirely harmless. The case
went before the Supreme Court a second time. Justice Minton considered
the juror's testimony about how the incident affected him and stated that the
juror was indeed affected because he was very disturbed and troubled from
the date he was contacted until after the trial ended. 1 4 The Court vacated
the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial." 5 Consistent with
Reid, but inconsistent with Mattox and Hyde, the Court focused on juror
evidence about the effect of the outside influence on the thought processes
and decision of the jurors.
Remmer can be distinguished from the previous cases since in Remmer
the outside influence was discovered by the trial judge prior to the close of
the case. The rule limiting impeachment of jury verdicts is not implicated
prior to the delivery of the verdict. In essence, the error complained of was
that the trial judge erred in not disclosing the contact to counsel and by
conducting the investigation ex parte. Subsequent decisions by the Court,
however, have not drawn this distinction, but have followed Remmer by per-
mitting juror testimony on the issue of the effect that the outside influence
had on the jurors' deliberation and vote. For example, in Parker v. Glad-
den 116 petitioner's wife started to investigate the circumstances of the jurors'
deliberations in her husband's case two years after the verdict was rendered.
She discovered that while the jury was sequestered, the bailiff stated to sev-
eral jurors, "Oh that wicked fellow [petitioner] he is guilty,'' 117 and to an-
other, "If there is anything wrong [in finding petitioner guilty] the Supreme
112. 350 U.S. 377 (1956).
113. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-30 (1954).
114. 350 U.S. at 381. See also Gold v. United States, 352 U.S. 985 (1957) (per curiam), in
which the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of a new trial because of "official, [but uninten-
tional] intrusion into the privacy of the jury." Id. While defendant was being tried for perjury
in filing a false noncommunist affidavit, FBI agents investigating another case of a false
noncommunist affidavit contacted three members of the jury or their families to inquire
whether they received any "propaganda" literature. 237 F.2d 764, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The
trial judge conducted a hearing and dismissed two of the jurors.
115. 350 U.S. at 381.




Court will correct it."' 118 In a per curiam opinion the Supreme Court held
that the bailiff's improper conduct violated the accused's sixth amendment
right to a trial by an impartial jury and his right to confrontation.11 9 Con-
sidering a juror's affidavit that she in fact was prejudiced by the statements,
the Court further concluded that the violation was prejudicial.1 20
In Parker the Supreme Court once again failed to establish a clear rule for
dealing with the problem of impeachment of juror verdicts. The determina-
tion that the comments violated the sixth amendment, however, substan-
tially complicated the resolution of the issue in future cases. Based on
Parker the criminally accused has constitutional support and a federal forum
for the claim that misconduct of jurors should be freely investigated and
developed as evidence for a new trial unfettered by federal or state proce-
dural limitations restricting juror testimony. Second, the standard of review
of the potential misconduct is affected once constitutional error is estab-
lished. The burden is on the state to prove that the misconduct was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt and not on the appellant to prove that it was
prejudicial. 121
In the Parker dissent, Justice Harlan anticipated some of these problems,
stating that "though I believe unintentionally, the Court's opinion leaves
open the possibility of automatically requiring a mistrial on constitutional
grounds whenever any juror is exposed to any potentially prejudicial expres-
sion of opinion. . . .The potentialities of today's decision may go far be-
yond what, I am sure, the Court intends."1 22 Justice Harlan, who did not
necessarily view the sixth amendment as directly applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment, analyzed the problem under the doc-
trine of fundamental fairness implicit in the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.123 Justice Harlan viewed the contacts as inconsequential
and the evidence of prejudice to be trivial. 124
III. FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 606(b)
Although the Supreme Court has been reluctant to adopt a single rule to
deal with the scope of evidence in juror misconduct cases, the several rule-
making bodies involved in the development of the Federal Rules of Evidence
each recommended a specific rule.1 25 Eventually Federal Rule of Evidence
118. Id. at 364.
119. Id. at 366.
120. The Court concluded alternatively that the unauthorized conduct of the bailiff "in-
volves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due
process." Id. at 365 (citing Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1965)).
121. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S.
140, 149 (1892).
122. 385 U.S. at 368-69.
123. Id. at 367.
124. Id. at 368.
125. Judge Friendly in his testimony, on the other hand, urged that no rule be adopted and
the issue be left to case-by-case development. House Hearings before the Special Subcomm. on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 250
(1973) (testimony of Henry J. Friendly, Chief Judge, U.S. Ct. of Appeals, 2d Cir.).
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606(b) was enacted. 126 The debate on rule 606(b) centered largely on the
extent to which jurors could testify about misconduct in the jury room, such
as agreeing to a quotient verdict. The preliminary draft of the Supreme
Court Advisory Committee 127 included a rule prohibiting juror testimony or
affidavit on "the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or
emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict . . . or
concerning his mental processes in connection therewith."' 128 This ap-
proach, consistent with the portion of the Perry decision quoted by the
Supreme Court in Mattox,129 is sometimes referred to as the Iowa rule and
would permit jurors to testify about improper acts done in the jury room,
such as quotient verdicts or decisions by lot. The Advisory Committee's
final draft of the rule,130 which was promulgated by the Supreme Court,'31
added the restriction that jurors could not testify as to "any matter or state-
ment occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations."' 32 The rule
provided an exception permitting jurors to testify as to "whether extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any
juror."13 3
The Advisory Committee Notes give no explanation for the change. The
Advisory Committee might have been influenced 134 by the strenuous objec-
tions raised by the Justice Department and Senator McClellan that the origi-
nal proposed rule would make jurors susceptible to harassment and damage
the finality of jury verdicts. 35 After hearings before a subcommittee of the
Judiciary Committee chaired by Representative Hungate, the House of Rep-
resentatives reinstated the substance of the original Advisory Committee
proposal, which permitted jurors to testify about objective misconduct that
126. See generally 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 606-2 to -9
[hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE] for a discussion of legislative history of rule
606(b).
127. Reprinted in 46 F.R.D. 161, 289 (1969).
128. Id. at 289-90.
129. See supra notes 91 & 92 and accompanying text.
130. 56 F.R.D. 183, 265 (1972). The rule provides:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or
emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indict-
ment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a
juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information
was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence
was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evi-
dence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be
precluded from testifying be received.
131. See Order Promulgating the Federal Rules of Evidence, 56 F.R.D. 184 (1972).
132. Id. at 265.
133. Id.
134. See House Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 179-80, 191 (1973) (statements of Charles
R. Halpern and George T. Frampton on behalf of the Washington Council of Lawyers); see
also id. at 127 (statement of the Comm. on Federal Courts, the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York).
135. See 117 CONG. REC. 33582 (1971).
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they observed, whether it took place outside or inside the jury room.136 The
Senate in turn adopted the more restrictive rule, 137 as recommended by the
Supreme Court Advisory Committee and promulgated by the Supreme
Court, and the Conference Committee eventually adopted the Senate
version. 138
Throughout the debate little concern was expressed about the accuracy of
jury verdicts, litigants' rights, or society's interest in accurate, reliable jury
verdicts. The implications of Parker v. Gladden or Remmer v. United States
are practically ignored. The Advisory Committee Notes obliquely refer to
Parker, but give no suggestion as to how to reconcile the accused's constitu-
tional rights with the evidentiary rule limiting a juror's competency. 139
A great deal of litigation has implicated rule 606(b). The rule has proven
to be difficult to apply, thereby, encouraging more litigation. The rule re-
flects the political process that produced the Federal Rules of Evidence. It is
not based on consistent policy considerations centering on the accuracy or
even the proper functioning of the jury, but on principles of accommodation.
The thrust of the Advisory Committee rationale is that to disallow inquiry
into jury misconduct might be unjust, but to allow too much inquiry might
result in unacceptable ramifications; a compromise, therefore, results. No
strong, underlying policy basis provides guidance in the close case as to how
the rule should be interpreted.
Second, the rule is awkwardly phrased and is apparently intended to be
given an interpretation that is inconsistent with the plain meaning of its lan-
guage. Presumably any information that is used by the jurors to decide the
case could be classified as extraneous if it did not come from the admitted
evidence and the juror's general knowledge. To the extent that the juror's
decision is based in all or part on a particular predisposition toward a party's
race, age, sex, facial hair, economic status, personal belief about facts not
introduced into evidence, or improper understanding of the law, the verdict
would appear to be based on extraneous prejudicial information or outside
influence. A verdict based on chance, such as flipping a coin, would likewise
be an outside influence.
Nonetheless, the legislative history urges a more restrictive reading of the
language, but no clear definition is given. The Supreme Court Advisory
Committee defines by example, listing compromise verdicts, 140 quotient ver-
dicts, 14 1 speculation about insurance coverage,' 42 misinterpretation of in-
136. REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R.
Doc. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1973).
137. REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE SENATE, S. Doc. No. 1277, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 56, reprinted in Federal Rules of Evidence (1975).
138. Conference Report, 120 CONG. REC. 33941 (1974).
139. FED. R. EvID. 606(b) advisory committee note.
140. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 382 (1912).
141. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 269 (1915).
142. Holden v. Porter, 405 F.2d 878, 879 (10th Cir. 1969); Farmers Coop. Elevator Ass'n
v. Strand, 382 F.2d 224, 230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1014 (1967).
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structions,1 43 mistake in returning verdicts, 144 and improper inference from
a codefendant's guilty plea1 45 as matters that are not subject to juror testi-
mony. Statements by a bailiff or introduction of a prejudicial newspaper
account 146 into the jury room, however, are appropriate matters of inquiry.
The distinction between improper outside influences and improper inter-
nal influence is difficult and largely arbitrary. The distinction was addressed
in Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau,14 7 in which defendant maintained
that jurors heard certain rumors that improperly influenced the verdict. The
extraneous information included true rumors about killings that took place
during the trial, false rumors broadcast over a radio station that the FBI was
investigating the families of jurors, and unattributed rumors that the FBI
was investigating past conduct of three jurors. The trial judge attributed the
first two rumors to outside sources but because no evidence about the source
of the third rumor was available, the trial judge ruled that this rumor must
have been generated among the jury and not from an outside source. 148 Ju-
rors, therefore, could testify about the first two rumors, but not the third.
On appeal the court agreed that only the rumors attributed to outside
sources could be considered as possible outside influences. 149 In a discussion
that combines the competency of the evidence question with the issue of
whether a new trial should be granted, the court concluded that the rumors
about the FBI investigation of jurors should not be considered extraneous
influences for the purpose of impeaching the verdict. 150 The court reasoned
that since the rumors were not attributable to any source and were only
tangentially related to the issues in the case, they did not carry the coercive
force of a bribe or a threat. 151 The sixth amendment considerations were not
implicated because the accused was not tried using evidence from extrajudi-
cial sources. The integrity of the court was not put in jeopardy because the
rumors did not emanate from a governmental source or through failure on
the part of the court. Finally, permitting unattributed rumors to be suffi-
cient evidence to impeach verdicts would substantially undermine the final-
ity of jury verdicts, particularly in small communities. The confusion of the
competency of juror testimony issue with the issue of whether the alleged
incident merits remedial action blurs analysis, but is invited by the language
in the rule.
According to the rule jurors can testify that extraneous information was
improperly brought to their attention only if it was prejudicial information.
Before the court determines that a juror is competent to testify about the
extraneous information improperly before the jury, the court must presuma-
143. Farmers Coop. Elevator Ass'n v. Strand, 382 F.2d 224, 230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1014 (1967).
144. United States v. Chereton, 309 F.2d 197, 201 (6th Cir. 1962).
145. United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928, 949 (2d Cir. 1961).
146. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 140 (1892).
147. 523 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976).






bly determine that the information was prejudicial. Obviously, to determine
whether the information is prejudicial the court must consider the substance
and source of the statement to decide whether the juror is competent to
testify about the statement's substance and source. After a determination
that the extraneous information is prejudicial and the juror is competent to
testify about the matter, the court must consider the testimony and then
decide whether exposure to the prejudicial information necessitates a new
trial or was harmless error. To determine whether the prejudicial informa-
tion was harmless error, the court must decide whether the information was
likely to or did prejudice the jury.1 52
Obviously the concept of prejudice varies depending on whether the court
is deciding the basic competency question under rule 606(b) or, after the
evidence is deemed competent, deciding whether a new trial should be
granted. Clearly the assessment of prejudice on the competency issue must
be made with respect to potential prejudice and could be made by an offer of
proof. Nonetheless, if the judge must consider the substance of the proposed
testimony before ruling on the competency question, much of the policy un-
derlying the implementation of the rule is thwarted. The privacy of the de-
liberative process is destroyed, jurors are subject to scrutiny by losing
litigants, and the public is apprised of a potential flaw in the truth-finding
mechanism of the court process. Only the interest of finality is protected,
because the misconduct will give rise to a new trial only in rare
circumstances.
If the alleged misconduct involves improper influence and not extraneous
information, the rule does not require that the court make a preliminary
finding of prejudice or potential prejudice before a juror is competent to tes-
tify. In encompassing outside influence, the rule presumably contemplates
attempts by third parties to influence the result by bribes, threats, or other
means. This activity poses the most serious threat to the proper operation of
the jury system. A commitment to decisionmaking by lay citizens contem-
plates certain risks. Decisions will not be made by experts in the law and
sciences, or necessarily in a rational step-by-step efficient decisionmaking
process. The decision will be the result of a group deliberation, the group
being composed of citizens with various experiences in life, various abilities
to reason and assimilate, and various political, personal, and philosophical
perspectives. Supporters of the evidentiary rule are willing to take the risk
that these lay jurors might make mistakes in the deliberation process or that
they might choose conscientiously to disregard the law or fact. The rule's
supporters are not willing to risk a jury decision dictated or influenced by an
outside source brought to bear specifically on the trial.
IV. FEDERAL COURTS' APPLICATION OF RULE 606(b)
The application and interpretation of rule 606(b) has generated considera-
152. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 368 (1966); United States v. Horton, 646 F.2d 181,
186 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Williams, 613 F.2d 573, 575 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
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ble litigation in both the trial and appellate courts. While lower federal
courts generally attempt to apply the rule as written, recent Supreme Court
decisions raise questions about the validity of the rule, at least in criminal
cases. The rule applies only to impeachment of verdicts; issues concerning
misconduct at voir dire, 153 or issues of misconduct or impropriety that are
addressed prior to accepting the verdict, 154 are not affected by this rule. 15'
As to these matters the trial court may, and in most cases should, make an
encompassing examination of the jurors to determine the nature of any mis-
conduct and its impact on the jurors or their future deliberations and
verdict. '56
Federal appellate courts have construed rule 606(b) to permit juror testi-
mony in numerous situations, including cases in which a juror: (1) consulted
a dictionary 157 or other book;158 (2) compared evidence in the present case
with evidence in another murder case in which a juror had served;' 59
(3) conducted a library investigation to determine that defendants could eas-
ily have discovered the fictitious nature of an alleged corporation; 16° (4) en-
gaged in conversation with the bailiff' 6 1 or judge;162 (5) received improper
exhibits 163 or newspaper articles in the jury room; 164 (6) witnessed a govern-
ment investigator testify at trial and subsequently play tapes in the jury
room; 165 (7) experienced exposure to possible jury tampering;166 or (8) con-
153. Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1190 (1 th Cir. 1982) (on voir dire examination
juror, a minor, misrepresented that she was 21 years of age).
154. United States v. Freedson, 608 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Gerardi, 586
F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1978) (juror changed mind one-half hour after verdict accepted); see also
Traver v. Meshrity, 627 F.2d 934, 941 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Once a verdict has been delivered and
accepted in open court, and the jury is polled and discharged, jurors may not claim that their
assent was mistaken or unwilling."); cf. Mount Airy Lodge Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 96 F.R.D. 378,
381 (E.D. Penn. 1982) (testimony that all jurors agree "that through inadvertence, oversight or
mistake the verdict announced was not the verdict on which agreement had been reached" is
not an impeachment of verdict but a reformation).
155. See United States v. Robinson, 645 F.2d 616 (8th Cir.) (juror can testify on mistrial
motion based on publicity or tampering) (citing 3 WEINSTEIN'S EvIDENCE, supra note 126,
§ 606[04], at 606-32), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 75 (1981).
156. United States v. Bohr, 581 F.2d 1294, 1302 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958
(1978); 3 WEINSTEIN's EvIDENCE, supra note 126, 606[05], at 606-39 to -45.
157. United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 866 (4th Cir. 1979).
158. United States v. Bassler, 651 F.2d 600, 601-02 (8th Cir. 1981) (jurors consulted Rob-
ert's Rule of Order).
159. Smith v. Brewer, 444 F. Supp. 482, 491 (D.C. Iowa), aifid, 577 F.2d 466 (1978).
160. United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 888 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
962 (1982).
161. United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 765 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981
(1978).
162. United States v. Williams, 613 F.2d 573, 575 (5th Cir.) (ex parte communication be-
tween juror and trial court), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980).
163. United States v. Bruscino, 687 F.2d 938, 940 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1228 (1982); United States v. Friedland, 660 F.2d 919, 928 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 989 (1982).
164. United States v. Bruscino, 687 F.2d 938, 940 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1228 (1982); see also United States v. Horton, 646 F.2d 181, 188-89 (5th Cir.) (juror
influenced by media in general), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 970 (1981).
165. United States v. Freeman, 634 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (10th Cir. 1980).
166. United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 664-66 (2d Cir. 1978).
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ducted an independent investigation.' 67
The courts have interpreted the rule to preclude juror testimony when the
jurors allegedly: (1) misunderstood the instructions;168 (2) intentionally dis-
regarded the instructions; 169 (3) considered defendant's failure to take the
witness stand; 170 (4) coerced and harassed fellow jurors;17 1 (5) never in-
tended to unqualifiedly vote guilty or were confused by the proceedings;' 72
(6) entered a compromise or quotient verdict;173 (7) based the verdict on
secret beliefs or prejudices unrelated to the law or facts; 174 or (8) wrote a
love letter to the United States attorney inviting her to lunch. 175 Further,
the federal courts have precluded jurors' testimony on the issue of their
mental processes in arriving at a verdict,' 76 their intention in answering a
special interrogatory, 177 the effect on jurors of nonuniformed marshalls sta-
tioned in the courtroom for security purposes, 78 and the way a jury dead-
lock was broken. 179
The Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have attempted to apply the rule
without questioning whether the rule properly accommodates society's inter-
est in finality, confidentiality, and fair trial. Thus, most opinions attempt to
interpret the rule's language in light of its legislative history.
Several issues of particular importance remain unresolved and clouded by
recent decisions by the Supreme Court. Whether jurors are incompetent to
testify about a bias manifested during deliberations is unresolved. Once mis-
167. In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 213-14 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 2090, 77 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1983).
168. United States v4 D'Angelo, 598 F.2d 1002, 1003-05 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Stacey, 475 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1973).
169. United States v. D'Angelo, 598 F.2d 1002, 1003 (5th Cir. 1979).
170. United States v. Friedland, 660 F.2d 919, 927-28 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
989 (1982); United States v. Edwards, 486 F. Supp. 673, 674 (S.D.N.Y.), afld, 633 F.2d 207
(2d Cir. 1980).
171. United States v. Freedson, 608 F.2d 739, 741 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Mar-
ques, 600 F.2d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 1979); cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019 (1980); Simmons First
Nat'l Bank v. Ford Motor Co., 88 F.R.D. 344, 347-48 (E.D. Ark. 1980); Smith v. Brewer, 444
F. Supp. 482, 487 (S.D. Iowa), afl'd, 577 F.2d 466 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978).
172. United States v. Jelsma, 630 F.2d 778, 779 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Weiner,
578 F.2d 757, 764 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978).
173. United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 151-52 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v.
Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1019 (1980).
174. United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 151-52 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
175. United States v. Beltempo, 675 F.2d 472, 481 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135
(1982).
176. Carson v. Polley, 689 F.2d 562, 570-71 (5th Cir. 1982) (consideration of inadmissible
evidence); United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (compromise ver-
dict); United States v. Brooks, 677 F.2d 907, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (subconscious prejudice);
United States v. Vincent, 648 F.2d 1046, 1050 (5th Cir. 1981) (coercive effect of Allen charge);
United State v. Duzac, 622 F.2d 911, 913 (5th Cir.) (prejudice), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012
(1980); United States v. Bohr, 581 F.2d 1294, 1302 (8th Cir.) (sympathy for victim), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 958 (1978); see also Poches v. J.J. Newberry Co., 549 F.2d 1166, 1169 (8th
Cir. 1977) (letter from nonjuror exposing decision-process of jurors after jury-foreman had
relayed process to him may be inadmissible under rule 606(b)).
177. Brewer v. Jeep Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1147, 1157-58 (D.C. Ark. 1982), a.f'd, 724 F.2d
653 (8th Cir. 1983).
178. United States v. Gambina, 564 F.2d 22, 24 (8th Cir. 1977).
179. Wilkerson v. Amco Corp., 703 F.2d 184, 185-86 (5th Cir. 1983).
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conduct or impropriety is established, the extent to which jurors may testify
about the impact the misconduct or impropriety had on the verdict is like-
wise unclear.180
Recent Supreme Court decisions have recognized an accused's constitu-
tional rights in the decisionmaking process and cast substantial doubt on
whether the rule has any applicability in criminal cases. A straightforward
interpretation of the rule in light of the legislative history would preclude
juror testimony on issues of bias or evidence of the impact that misconduct
had on the jury's verdict. A bias or predisposition to resolve a case in a
particular manner or to view facts from a particular perspective reflects on
thought processes and mental impressions. Futhermore, the most direct in-
quiry into thought processes or mental impressions is to ask jurors what
impact certain conduct or statements had on their verdict. Recent Supreme
Court decisions, however, justify such an inquiry, despite the language and
the policy behind the rule. The Supreme Court has not reconciled its deci-
sions with the conflicting policy considerations and the language of the evi-
dentiary rule.
Lower federal courts have considered the bias issue. The federal district
court in Smith v. Brewer'81 addressed the issue of juror bias. The petitioner
in Smith sought habeas corpus relief on the grounds of juror misconduct. A
juror testified about internal pressures, racial overtones, and a comparison
by one of the jurors with a previous jury experience. The federal district
court concluded that rule 606(b) precluded evidence of the internal pressures
and the racial bias, but permitted evidence of the juror's comparison with
the previous trial.18 2 The court noted that bias manifested in the jury room
is difficult to characterize as either an outside or inside influence.' 8 3 Relying
on the legislative history of the rule, the court concluded that "it seems bet-
ter to draw [the line] in favor of juror privacy."' 184 The court focused on the
concept of prejudice, however, stating that if "an offer of proof showed that
there was a substantial likelihood that a criminal defendant was prejudiced
by the influence of racial bias in the jury room, to ignore the evidence might
very well offend fundamental fairness."' 18 5 The court held that the evidence
of bias was incompetent in this case because it was unlikely to have been
180. Compare United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 884-85 (9th Cir. 1981) (juror not
competent to testify about impact of misconduct), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 962 (1982); United
States v. Horton, 646 F.2d 181, 188 & n.3 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 970 (1981);
United States v. Geer, 620 F.2d 1383, 1385 (10th Cir. 1980) (same); United States v. Duncan,
598 F.2d 839, 866 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979), with In re Beverly Hills
Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207, 213 (6th Cir. 1982) (jurors may testify about impact), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 2090, 77 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1983); Government of Virginia Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d
140, 148-50 (3d Cir. 1975) (same), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976).
181. 444 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Iowa), affd, 577 F.2d 466 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967
(1978).
182. 444 F. Supp. at 490.
183. Id. at 489 (citing 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 126, 606[04] (1976)).
184. 444 F. Supp. at 489 (quoting 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 126, 606[04], at
606-36). Juror privacy was no longer an issue since the witness testified about events in the
jury room at the hearing.
185. 444 F. Supp. at 490 (citing McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268-69 (1915)).
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prejudicial. 16 The court next concluded that the discussion about previous
juror service was admissible under rule 606(b), but did not justify a new trial
because petitioner failed to show that he was prejudiced by the discussion. 187
In Carson v. Polley'"8 the Fifth Circuit also left open the possibility that
bias or prejudice can be a proper subject matter for juror testimony on a
post-trial motion. In Carson the court concluded that a letter written by a
juror during deliberations, exposing views that would not be proper matter
for jury deliberation or reliance, reveals thought processes and not matters
admissible under rule 606(b).' 8 9 The court stated that "[w]hile jurors may
reach a verdict because of secret beliefs that have little to do with law or
facts, such matters are not the proper subject of inquiry after verdict."' 190
The court suggested, however, that a juror letter revealing substantial preju-
dice or bias could be competent evidence and serve as the basis for granting a
new trial. 191
The Carson opinion did not refer to the 1980 decision of a different panel
in the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Duzac. 192 During the deliberations
the trial judge in Duzac received the following message: "There are certain
prejudices among this jury due to prior personal experiences that prevent us
from arriving at a unanimous decision on Count 1 . . . . 193 After his con-
viction, the defendant unsuccessfully sought a new trial based on jury mis-
conduct. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
holding that the matters complained of could not impeach the jury verdict
and stating:
Here, there is no evidence that any external influence was brought to
bear on members of the jury. The prejudice complained of is alleged to
be the product of personal experiences unrelated to this litigation. The
proper time to discover such prejudices is when the jury is being se-
lected and preemptory challenges are available to the attorneys.
Although the jury is obligated to decide the case solely on the evidence,
its verdict may not be disturbed if it is later learned that personal
prejudices were not put aside during deliberations. 194
V. SUPREME COURT EXPANSION OF SCOPE OF JUROR TESTIMONY
The Supreme Court in Smith v. Phillips'95 discussed the use of post-trial
juror testimony to prove juror bias. In Phillips a juror contacted the district
attorney's office during the trial and applied for a job with the office. The
186. 444 F. Supp. at 490.
187. Id. at 491. In deciding the competence question, the court did not consider the
threshold question of prejudice.
188. 689 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1982).
189. Id. at 580-81.
190. Id. at 581 (citing United States v. D'Angelo, 598 F.2d 1002, 1005 (5th Cir. 1979)).
191. 689 F.2d at 581-82 (citing King-Size Publications, Inc. v. American News Co., 194 F.
Supp. 109 (D.N.J.) (letter from juror after verdict demonstrated sufficient prejudice to grant
new trial), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 920 (1961)).
192. 622 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1980).
193. Id. at 913.
194. Id.
195. 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
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prosecutors who were trying the case were apprised of the application. The
prosecutors ensured that no one from their office responded to the juror's
application, but concluded that informing the court or opposing counsel was
unnecessary. The juror had previously disclosed on voir dire that he had an
interest in law enforcement and that he had previously applied for employ-
ment with a federal drug enforcement agency. The district attorney learned
of the juror's application after the verdict. He conducted an investigation to
verify the facts and then informed the court and defense counsel. At a hear-
ing on the motion to set aside the verdict, the juror was interrogated and
testified that "I swore on oath to listen to the evidence and to render a ver-
dict on that evidence. I did so. ' ' 196 When asked if the prospect of employ-
ment with the district attorney in any way affected his verdict he replied,
"That didn't enter my mind; I didn't think about it that way."' 197 The trial
court concluded that the juror's letter was "an indiscretion but, in the light
of his voir dire, in no way reflected a premature conclusion as to the defend-
ant's guilt, or prejudice against the defendant, or an inability to consider the
guilt or innocence of the defendant solely on the evidence." 198
The court also held that a new trial should not be granted on the grounds
of government misconduct. 199 The court concluded that the events giving
rise to the motion did not influence the verdict. 200 The conviction was af-
firmed without opinion by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court,20 1
and the New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. 20 2 Several years
later, the petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York.20 3 The district court granted
the writ, concluding that "the average person in [the juror's] position would
believe that the verdict of the jury would directly affect the evaluation of his
job application. ' ' 204 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed
by a divided vote.20 5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 20 6
Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court and discussed sepa-
rately the issues of juror misconduct and prosecutorial misconduct. Accord-
ing to Justice Rehnquist, "[d]ue process means a jury capable and willing to
decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watch-
ful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such
occurrences when they happen. ' 20 7 To resolve a claim of juror bias, the trial
196. People v. Phillips, 87 Misc. 2d 623, 618, 384 N.Y.S.2d 906, 911-12 (Sup. Ct. 1975),
aff'd mem., 384 N.Y.S.2d 715 (App. Div. 1976).
197. 384 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
198. Id. at 915.
199. Id. at 917.
200. Id. at 918.
201. 384 N.Y.S.2d 715 (App. Div. 1976).
202. 386 N.Y.S.2d 1039 (1976).
203. 485 F. Supp. 1365 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
204. Id. at 1371-72.
205. 632 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1980). The decision of the court of appeals is based on the
finding that the prosecution's failure to disclose violated due process. Id. at 1023-24.
206. 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
207. Id. at 217.
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court should hold a hearing in which the defendant can prove actual bias.20 8
The Court affirmed the trial judge's conclusion that this case involved no
actual bias.20 9
In reaching this conclusion, the Court did not distinguish between ques-
tions of bias raised prior to trial, when prospective jurors should be excused
for bias, and questions raised after the trial, when the issue is whether a new
trial should be granted because of a biased juror.210 The Court also did not
reconcile its opinion with Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and the cases or
rationale upon which the rule is premised.
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed that a post-trial hearing
is necessary to resolve an allegation of juror bias:
A hearing permits counsel to probe the juror's memory, his reasons for
acting as he did, and his understanding of the consequences of his ac-
tions. A hearing also permits the trial judge to observe the juror's de-
meanor under cross-examination and to evaluate his answers in light of
the particular circumstances of the case. 2 11
Justice O'Connor stated that extreme situations might justify a finding of
implied bias.2 12 The Court could imply bias if a juror is an actual employee
of the prosecuting agency, a close relative of one of the participants in the
trial or the criminal transaction, or a participant or witness to the transac-
tion.21 3 Justice O'Connor relied on Leonard v. United States,21 4 in which the
Court held that jurors were automatically disqualified from sitting on a trial
when they heard the trial court announce the defendant's guilty verdict on a
similar charge.2 15 According to Justice O'Connor, the majority opinion did
not foreclose a finding of implied bias in an appropriate case. 2 16
Justice Marshall authored a dissent in which Justices Brennan and Stevens
joined. Initially, Justice Marshall distinguished juror bias from the concept
of prejudice. According to Justice Marshall, the Court:
has required inquiry into prejudice even when there was no evidence
that a particular juror was biased; has regarded the absence of a bal-
anced perspective, and not simply the existence of bias against defend-
ant, as a cognizable form of prejudice; has not always required a
particularized showing of prejudice; and has strongly presumed that
contact with a juror initiated by a third party is prejudicial. 2 17
Because the juror had a clear conflict of interest that would "inevitably dis-
208. Id. at 215.
209. Id. at 218. The Court noted that in this federal habeas corpus action the trial judge's
findings are presumptively correct according to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982). 455 U.S. at 218.
210. The court relied on Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981); Dennis v. United States,
339 U.S. 162 (1950); Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497 (1948); and United States v. Wood,
299 U.S. 123 (1936). All involved the standard for pretrial challenges to prospective jurors.
211. 455 U.S. at 222.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 378 U.S. 544 (1964) (per curiam).
215. Id. at 545.
216. 455 U.S. at 228.
217. Id.
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tort his perspective on the case,"' 218 Justice Marshall maintained that the
Court's holding was inconsistent with the historical recognition of the right
to trial by an impartial jury. 219 Second, according to Justice Marshall the
post-trial hearing was not adequate to protect petitioner's rights. 220 Justice
Marshall argued that the probability of bias was strong and the post-trial
hearing is ineffective to reveal the bias.221 If the bias were intentional, the
juror would probably not admit to it; if the bias were unconscious, an exami-
nation of the juror would not reveal the bias.222 Justice Marshall, therefore,
agreed with the federal district court's use of an implied bias standard in this
case.
223
All of the Justices agreed that the conduct in this case could constitute a
due process violation depriving the defendant of his right to a fair and im-
partial jury. Six of the Justices concluded that the conduct justified a post-
trial hearing to determine the extent to which the juror's action affected the
juror's thought processes. The defendant had a meticulous and lengthy voir
dire in which he clearly revealed his interest in a law enforcement career.
The case did not involve lying at voir dire, criminal contempt, criminal juror
misconduct, or outside pressure put on a juror. The juror chose to submit
the application and chose to put himself in the potential situation of conflict.
The extent to which this choice had an impact on his thought processes or
vote should not be the subject of competent testimony under rule 606(b). 224
In Phillips the Court held that to establish a violation of due process the
accused must prove actual bias. 225 Certainly it would be inconsistent with
the concept of due process to preclude the accused, through rules of compe-
tency, from proving bias by juror testimony. The federal policy expressed in
rule 606(b) of protecting jurors from harassment and assuring finality must
give way to the protection of the accused's constitutional rights. Phillips
apparently justifies an intrusive investigation into juror motivations and
thought processes when the defendant properly raises a valid issue of juror
bias in a criminal case.
Justice Rehnquist relied heavily on Remmer for the proposition that a
hearing to determine actual bias is the appropriate way to deal with these
allegations. 226 Remmer, however, was not premised on constitutional prin-
ciples and was decided prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. 227 As in Remmer, the Court could have chosen a narrower ground to
decide the case and perhaps can still limit the impact of these cases in the




221. Id. at 229.
222. Id. at 230.
223. Id. at 231-32.
224. Although the case began as a state prosecution, because the case involved a federal
constitutional question, federal competency rules were applicable. FED. R. EVID. 601 & 1101.
225. 455 U.S. at 215.
226. Id. at 217.
227. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
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by the government prior to the final verdict by the jury. If, of course, the
trial judge in either case had undertaken a preverdict examination of the
alleged misconduct, the proper and necessary act would be to inquire indi-
vidually whether the jurors could still be fair and impartial. Rule 606(b)
would not bar such an inquiry. Prior to final judgment, the interest in final-
ity is better served by making the inquiry. If the juror is unfit to serve, an
alternate might be available 22 8 or the parties might agree to a decision by
fewer jurors. The Court in Phillips, however, refused to distinguish between
a hearing after the verdict and one prior to the verdict.
The Supreme Court again addressed the issue of juror bias in Rushen v.
Spain.229 The respondent in Rushen was convicted of two counts of murder
and of conspiracy to escape from San Quentin. 230 The prosecution's theory
of the case was that respondent, a member of the Black Panthers, and five
other prisoners were involved in an escape organized by the Black Panther
Party. During the escape attempt three prisoners and three corrections of-
ficers were killed. At the voir dire of prospective jurors, Patricia Fagan testi-
fied that "she had no personal knowledge of violent crimes-as a witness,
victim, or otherwise-and that she did not associate the Black Panther Party
with any form of violence."' 231 Fagan was chosen and served as a juror for
this seventeen-month trial. During the trial, Fagan remembered that one of
her childhood friends was murdered by a member of the Black Panthers.
This very murder became a subject of inquiry at trial, and this discussion
apparently refreshed Fagan's recollection. 232 Fagan, agitated by the recol-
lection, met twice with the trial judge. According to the Supreme Court, she
assured the trial judge on each occasion that the events would not affect her
disposition of the cases. 233 After the trial, respondent's counsel learned of
the ex parte meetings and moved for a new trial. 234 At the hearing for a new
trial Fagan testified that "she had not remembered her friend's death during
voir dire, and that her subsequent recollection did not affect her ability im-
partially to judge respondent's innocence or guilt."' 2 35 She admitted telling
other jurors that she knew the murder victim, but she denied making re-
marks about the Black Panther Party.2 36 According to the majority opinion,
Fagan also repeatedly testified that the recollection of the incident did not
228. Three alternative jurors were available in Phillips. 455 U.S. at 213.
229. 104 S. Ct. 453, 78 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1983) (per curiam).
230. The murder convictions were based on a theory of vicarious liability. Id. at 464 n.8,
78 L. Ed. 2d at 283 n.8.
231. Id. at 454, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 271.
232. The defense maintained that the murderer of Fagan's friend was the informant in the
police plot to organize the break-out and ambush the defendants in an attempt to cripple the
Black Panther Party.
233. 104 S. Ct. at 454, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 271.
234. Id. at 464, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 283. Respondent, the only Black Panther among the six
defendants, was the only defendant convicted on the murder charges. Three defendants were
acquitted of all charges, and two others were convicted of assault. Id.
235. Id. at 454, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 272.
236. Id.
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affect her impartiality.237
The trial judge denied the motion for new trial, stating that the ex parte
communications to the judge "lacked any significance" and that respondent
suffered no prejudice. 238 The California Court of Appeals found that the
communications constituted constitutional error, but were harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.2 39 The federal district court granted the writ of habeas
corpus, concluding that the ex parte communications between the judge and
juror violated respondent's constitutional right to be present at a critical
stage of the proceedings and his right to counsel.240 The district court found
that the error required automatic reversal because the absence of a record
precluded an intelligent application of the harmless error standard. 24 1 In the
alternative, the court concluded that the state could not prove that the error
was harmless through a post-trial hearing. 242 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed. 243 In a per curiam opinion, the United States
Supreme Court simultaneously granted the petition for certiorari and sum-
marily vacated the judgment of the court of appeals.2 " Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackman filed separate dissents, and Justice Stevens con-
curred in the judgment.
The majority opinion is remarkable for several reasons. Relying heavily
on Smith v. Phillips245 and Remmer v. United States,246 the majority initially
held that a post-trial hearing with juror testimony is an appropriate method
for determining whether this error, which the state conceded was a violation
of the constitutional right to be present at critical stages and the right to
counsel, constituted harmless error. 247 Second, the Court concluded that
the issue of harmless error or prejudice was a question of fact.248 The state
court's judgment on the issue of juror impartiality and bias should, there-
fore, be affirmed unless it lacked fair support in the record. 249 Third, in
reviewing the record to determine whether evidence adequately supported
the conclusion that juror Fagan's presence on the jury did not prejudice re-
237. Id. at 457, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 274. According to Justice Marshall, the majority mis-
characterized the testimony:
The only testimony at the hearing that pertained to their discussion of her im-
partiality was provided by the trial judge. His account of their conversations
indicated (at most) that Fagan had assured him that she would remain impartial
when it came time to render a verdict. . . . But nothing in the record indicates
whether Fagan was able to keep her promise that she would remain unbiased.
Id. at 465 n.13, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 284 n.13 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
238. Id. at 454-55, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 272.





244. Id. at 457, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 275.
245. 455 U.S. 209 (1982). For a discussion of Phillips, see supra notes 195-228 and accom-
panying text.
246. 347 U.S. 227 (1954). For a discussion of Remmer, see supra notes 112-15 and accom-
panying text.
247. 104 S. Ct. at 456, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 273-74.
248. Id., 78 L. Ed. 2d at 274.
249. Id. at 456-57, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 274.
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spondent, the Court considered, in clear violation of rule 606(b), Fagan's
testimony "that, upon recollection, the incident did not affect her impartial-
ity."'250 In a footnote the Court misquotes the Federal Rule of Evidence by
stating that: "A juror may testify concerning any mental bias in matters
unrelated to the specific issues that the juror was called upon to decide ...
But a juror generally cannot testify about the mental process by which the
verdict was arrived."' 251 The Court, therefore, rewrote rule 606(b) and, for
that matter, the law in the federal courts with respect to impeachment of
jury verdicts.
The Court's paramount concern was the actual impact of the constitu-
tional error on the juror's decision to convict. 252 The broader societal inter-
ests of finality, privacy, and procedural fairness addressed and
accommodated by the evidentiary rule are ignored or are, at best, secondary
considerations. The Court viewed questions of juror testimony as questions
of credibility to be resolved by a trier of fact, as opposed to questions relating
to legal competency under the evidentiary rule.25 3 This approach encour-
ages an evidentiary inquiry into whether, and how, particular jurors were
influenced by improper conduct or considerations. This case-by-case ap-
proach to resolving constitutional harmless error, juror bias, or misconduct
cases has substantial implications for the role and function of the jury and
the relationship and function of the trial and appellate courts. The approach
also has a substantial impact on the finality of jury verdicts.
The Rushen case suggests a revolutionary approach to appellate review of
constitutional error. To what extent should the harmless error analysis for
other constitutional violations be established through juror testimony? Since
the nature of the error in Rushen consisted of alleged juror bias and the
impact of this bias on deliberations and verdict, then presumably the testi-
mony from jurors would certainly be pertinent to the inquiry. Juror testi-
mony, however, would be equally pertinent in other situations in which
constitutional error has been established and the issue is whether the error
had any impact on the jurors' verdict or deliberations. 254
250. Id. at 457, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 274. The California statute governing juror testimony is
broader than the federal rule. See CAL. EvID. CODE ANN. § 1150(a) (West 1966). Since the
rule is framed in competency terms and the error complained of is federal constitutional error,
the federal evidentiary rule applied. FED. R. EvID. 601. The majority did not discuss which
rule should apply, but did cite the federal rule. Justice Marshall maintained that juror Fagan
gave no such testimony and her testimony was limited to "what she had known, believed, or
felt at various points in the trial." Id. at 465, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 284; see supra note 237.
251. Id. at 457 n.5, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 274 n.5 (citations omitted).
252. One commentator stated: "[T]he Burger Court's belief [is] that the ultimate mission
of the criminal justice system is to convict the guilty and let the innocent go free." C. WHITE-
BREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CASES AND CONCEPTS
4 (1980); see Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 864 (1975) ("IT]he ultimate objective [is]
that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.").
253. See 104 S. Ct. at 457 n.6, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 275 n.6 (characterizing Justice Marshall's
concern for relying on juror testimony as an argument relating to the credibility, not the com-
petency, of the evidence).
254. For example in United States v. Hasting, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 76 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983), the
Court held that the prosecutor's comments about the defendants' failure to testify was harm-
less error in the absence of a post-trial hearing to determine the impact that these comments
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens recognized the danger of the ma-
jority's approach and urged that the issue should be recast to determine
whether petitioner was denied due process. 255 Justice Marshall agreed with
Justice Stevens, pointing out that the majority's reliance on Smith v. Phillips
was misplaced because in Smith the proof of actual impairment of the jury's
impartiality was the decisive factor in finding a constitutional violation. 256
The Smith Court ruled that only if the defendant affirmatively proves bias on
the part of a juror could he establish a violation of due process. Concluding
that the state court's determination that the defendant had not proved bias
was supported by the record and therefore was not vulnerable to review by
the district court, the majority in Smith held that no constitutional violation
had been established. 257
The majority in Rushen, however, did not distinguish between issues of
jury tampering, 258 juror misconduct or bias,259 or whether constitutional er-
ror is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.260 According to the majority,
the procedure for dealing with each of these issues is a post-trial hearing
involving juror testimony to ascertain the impact of the tampering, bias, or
constitutional error on the deliberations or verdict. 261 The scope and pur-
pose of the hearing is quite similar and apparently governed by the same
principles as pretrial or preverdict voir dire; the court relies heavily on the
jurors' personal statements about whether they can be or in fact were fair
and impartial. 262
The majority did not directly address the concerns that support the histor-
ical rule limiting post-trial juror testimony to impeach jury verdicts,
although the interest of the litigants, the jurors, and society vary substan-
tially depending on whether the hearing is a postverdict or a preverdict voir
dire. At the pretrial voir dire the prospective jurors presumably have no
personal stake in the outcome. Their obligation is to answer questions truth-
fully, and, as long as they answer truthfully, they will suffer no personal
adverse legal consequences. The trial judge can put some trust in their state-
ments. Furthermore, to the extent that a venireman responds that he or she
cannot be fair and impartial, that juror can be dismissed with little loss of
societal resources. A voir dire during the trial might raise slightly different
had on the jurors' deliberations or vote. Id. at 1981-82, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 107-08. The Justices of
the Supreme Court of the United States perused the voluminous record and drew their own
factual inferences about the evidence, since the harmless error issue was not addressed by the
lower courts.
255. 104 S. Ct. at 460-62, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 278-81.
256. Id. at 468-69 n.23, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 289 n.23.
257. Id.
258. See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); seesupra notes 116-24 and accompanying
text.
259. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) (discussed supra text accompanying notes
195-228); Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377 (1956) (discussed supra text accompanying
notes 112-15).
260. 104 S. Ct. at 460, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 274.
261. Id.




motivational factors since the jurors have invested time, energy, and emo-
tions in the particular trial and might be reluctant to give testimony that
would preclude continuation as a juror. In addition, depending on the avail-
ability of alternate jurors and the effect that dismissing one of the jurors
might have on the other jurors, the decision to dismiss one or more jurors
during the trial might have an impact on the deliberations or, in an extreme
case, require a mistrial. Generally, however, the court can again trust that
the juror's self-interest in remaining on the case will not color the responses
to questions and can rely on the juror's statements. Furthermore, if the voir
dire discloses improprieties, the impact of the improprieties might be allevi-
ated by appropriate cautionary instructions, removal of the juror, or other
steps taken by the court or counsel that would alleviate the necessity for a
mistrial.
The post-trial interview of jurors, however, raises substantially different
problems. If improprieties are discovered after the verdict is accepted, the
remedy is either to ignore them or to grant a new trial. 26 3 The jurors now
have a substantial self-interest in providing testimony that is consistent with
the validity of their verdict. They have taken a public position on the issue
and may be reluctant to provide testimony that they may have acted improp-
erly in arriving at that position. "The human propensity for self-justification
[makes it] very difficult to determine from a juror's own testimony after the
verdict whether he was impartial. Certainly a juror is unlikely to admit that
he had consciously plotted against the defendant during the course of the
trial.''264 The jurors' reluctance might also be reinforced by the possibility
that they as jurors might be subject to criminal sanctions if they acted im-
properly. For example, prior to testifying at the post-trial hearing in
Rushen, the juror Fagan was warned that her testimony might disclose a
violation of her oath of office as a juror and that she might face criminal
prosecution if such a violation had occurred. 26 5 The trial judge further in-
formed the juror that she had a right to have counsel present during the
questioning and that she had the right not to incriminate herself.
Treating questions of juror bias, misconduct, or prejudice as issues of fact,
to be resolved by a post-trial hearing with juror testimony, has some benefi-
cial implications. Such an approach would encourage a full airing of the
deliberation process to detect and flush out impropriety, making jurors more
accountable for their actions. This approach accords the trial judge's deter-
mination of the impact of the irregularity great weight in future appeals.
Appellate courts would defer to the trial judge's factual analysis, and thereby
restore the reviewing court's role to a more traditional and limited appellate
review. In recent years the application of the harmless error doctrine has
been broadened, and courts are reluctant to apply the per se rule of reversal
for constitutional error.266 In determining on a case-by-case basis whether
263. An additional societal remedy is to prosecute a juror if the conduct amounts to con-
tempt or perjury. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
264. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 230 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
265. Rushen V. Spain, 104 S. Ct. at 464, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 284 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
266. See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 1990, 76 L. Ed. 2d 96, 111 (1983)
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the error in a particular trial was prejudicial, the appellate courts are re-
quired to review records and assess factual inferences to decide as a constitu-
tional matter what impact any improper evidence or conduct might have
had on the jury. In addition to trivializing the Constitution, the appellate
function has become largely a fact-finding function in which the transcript is
reviewed and evidence is reassessed. The courts must assess both the appro-
priate weight and the strength of various inferences to be drawn from the
evidence and the possible inferences that the jury drew or might have drawn
from the erroneously admitted or excluded evidence in determining what
impact the error had or might have had on the deliberations and
proceedings.
Treating the determination of prejudice as a factual matter to be resolved
by the trial judge after a hearing and testimony from the jurors to some
extent limits the appellate function to a more traditional review of the record
to determine if the trial judge's determinations have an adequate basis. Sec-
ond, to the extent that juror testimony can be credited, it provides more
direct evidence on the impact of the error, and the court is not totally left to
its imagination to determine whether the jurors were affected by the error.
On the other hand, serious implications arise from the Supreme Court's re-
cent decisions concerning post-trial hearings with jurors to determine harm-
less error, bias, or prejudice. The decisions in Remmer, Smith, and Rushen
substantially undermine the interest in the finality and stability of jury ver-
dicts. Although each of the decisions had the immediate result of restoring
the jury verdict and trial court determination, thus superficially supporting
the concept of finality and stability of trial court decisions, the implications
of the decisions are to the contrary.
In assessing harmless error or prejudice without juror interview, the court
is entitled to, and must in most cases, assume that the jurors acted properly,
followed the instructions, and considered only properly admissible evi-
dence.2 67 The assumption is made in most cases, even when common sense
indicates that the jurors could not, or did not, follow the jury instructions
exactly as given. Recent studies confirm our common sense by revealing
that jurors do not lose their human characteristics when asked to serve as
jurors. Jurors bring to the jury room a full range of human characteristics
and weaknesses that preclude a totally sterile, objective, rational analysis of
(violation of Griffin rule is harmless error); United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 366-67
(1981) (violation of sixth amendment right to counsel is harmless error); Harrington v. Califor-
nia, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969) (violation of Bruton rule is harmless error). See also Connecticut
v. Johnson, 103 S. Ct. 969, 74 L. Ed. 2d 823 (1983), in which a four-to-four split resulted on
the issue of whether Sandstrom error was subject to a harmless error analysis. Justice Stevens
cast the deciding vote on different grounds, affirming the Connecticut Supreme Court's deci-
sion reversing the conviction on the counts affected by the erroneous instruction. For Justice
Stevens's view of the harmless error doctrine, see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 543-44 (1981)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
267. "A crucial assumption underlying [the system of trial by jury] is that juries will follow
the instructions given them by the trial judge." Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979);
see also R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 73, 74 (1970) ("The concept of a
fair trial encompasses a decision by a tribunal that has understood and applied the law to all
material issues in the case.").
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the evidence and instructions. Although the now famous Chicago Jury
Study conducted by Kalven and Zeisel concluded that jurors reach the same
result as the trial judge in seventy-five to eighty percent of the criminal cases
studied, 268 in reaching the final decision jurors frequently take into account
improper considerations. Broeder reported that extrajudicial considerations
played some role in the verdict reached in eight of sixteen civil cases and
four of seven criminal cases studied.269 Many writings have discussed the
impact on jurors of pretrial publicity.270 Numerous studies indicate that
factors such as sex, 2 7 1 race, 272 occupational background, 273 occupational
skill,274 physical appearance of parties, 275 severity of possible sanction, 276
past jury experience, 277 and consideration of evidence stricken from the rec-
ord278 all influence juror decisions. 279 Furthermore, many studies have con-
cluded that a very large number of citizens eligible to be jurors believe that if
a person is charged in a criminal matter he must be guilty. 280
If the jurors are to represent a cross-section of the community, they will
bring with them a cross-section of the bias, prejudices, and other shortcom-
ings of society, along with perhaps more noble qualities. A close inquiry into
the reasons why a juror reached a particular decision, or why the jury as a
whole reached a verdict, will frequently reveal impropriety in the use of evi-
dence, consideration of nonevidentiary matters, and a partial misapplication
of some of the jury instructions. To have the validity of a jury verdict turn
on the post-trial explanation of the individual jurors endangers the stability
and finality of those jury verdicts properly entered.
Although many jurors might be influenced by self-interest when testifying
268. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 57 (1966).
269. Broeder, Occupational Expertise and Bias as Affecting Juror Behavior: A Preliminary
Look, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1079 (1965).
270. See, e.g., Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 301-03 (1977); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333 (1966); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 725-29 (1961); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 8-3.3(c) (2d ed. 1980); Sue, Smith & Gilbert,
Biasing Effects of Pretrial Publicity on Judicial Decisions, 2 J. CRIM. JUST. 163 (1974).
271. Mann & Strodtbeck, Sex Role Differentiation in Jury Deliberations, 19 SOCIOMETRY 3
(1956); Snyder, Sex Role Differential and Juror Decisions, 55 SOCIOLOGY & Soc. RESEARCH
442 (1971); Stephan, Sex Prejudice in Jury Simulation, 88 J. PSYCHOLOGY 305 (1974).
272. Broeder, The Negro in Court, 1965 DUKE L.J. 19, 19-30.
273. Adler, Socioeconomic Factors Influencing Jury Verdicts, 3 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 1 (1973); Broeder, supra note 269; Hermann, Occupations of Jurors as an Influence
on Their Verdict, 5 FORUM 150 (1970).
274. Broeder, supra note 269.
275. Friend, Leaning Over Backwards. Jurors' Response to Defendants' Attractiveness, J.
COM. 124 (1974); Solender & Solender, Minimizing the Effect of the Unattractive Client on the
Jury: A Study of the Interaction of Physical Appearance with Assertions and Self-Experience
References, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 201 (1976).
276. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 268, at 306-12; Hester, Effects of a Mandatory
Death Penalty on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors as a Function of Heinousness of the Crime,
I J. CRIM. JUST. 319 (1973).
277. Broeder, Previous Jury Trial Service Affecting Juror Behavior, 506 INS. L.J. 138 (1965).
278. Sue, Smith & Caldwell, Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated
Jurors. A Moral Dilemma, 3 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 345 (1973).
279. See supra notes 168-79.
280. See NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK, SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES § 2.04 (2d ed.
1983) and studies cited therein.
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about their verdict, jurors will often come forward willingly to testify that
their verdict was improperly rendered. Particularly in cases in which unani-
mous verdicts are required, judges encourage jurors to compromise and
make accommodations. 28' Jurors may make accommodation reluctantly
and perhaps once free from the isolation and pressures of the jury room, they
develop second thoughts about their accommodations and compromises.
Such a juror might be easily influenced by counsel to testify that certain
evidence improperly admitted, or other improper circumstances, influenced
his or her decision to assent to the verdict. The finality of jury verdicts can
be undermined if their validity can be easily destroyed by such testimony.
The Supreme Court has not squarely decided whether establishing that
one of the jurors was prejudiced is sufficient to taint the entire verdict. Cer-
tain language in Rushen indicates that the majority might require proof that
more than one juror was prejudiced. Justice Stevens's concurring opinion
addressed the issue, stating that the jury's deliberations "as a whole" were
biased if only one juror was improperly influenced in his deliberations.282 In
Parker v. Gladden the Court responded to the state's argument that ten of
the jurors testified that they had not heard the bailiffs statements by stating
that the petitioner was entitled to be tried by a full twelve impartial and
unprejudiced jurors. 283
The Court's decisions emphasizing the use of post-trial hearings enhance
the motivations and responsibility of losing attorneys to conduct post-trial
interviews with jurors to elicit testimony necessary to overturn the verdict.
This result will have a detrimental impact on the protection of juror privacy.
Some jurisdictions offer additional protection by substantially limiting the
attorney's post-trial investigation of possible juror misconduct. 284 To the
extent that the Court's rulings encouraging post-trial hearings and relying on
juror testimony about actual bias or prejudice are premised on constitutional
grounds, the federal and local evidentiary rules must be superseded. Those
procedural rules that preclude counsel from investigating and developing ev-
idence from the jurors about the potential constitutional violations are sub-
stantially suspect if not patently unconstitutional. The substantial concern
for juror privacy, therefore, is largely ignored.
VI. DEMISE OF FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 606(b)
The demise of federal rule 606(b) was inevitable. The attempt to effectu-
ate significant policy considerations affecting vital substantive rights by rules
281. See I E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS
§§ 18.01, .14 (3d ed. 1977 & Supp. 1981).
282. Rushen v. Spain, 104 S. Ct. 453, 462 n.9, 78 L. Ed. 2d 469, 281 n.9 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
283. 385 U.S. 363, 366 (1966) (citing State v. Murray, 164 La. 883, 888, 114 So. 721, 723
(1927) (new trial required because of deputies' statements to jurors although nine jurors testi-
fied that deputies did not attempt to influence their judgment and ten jurors voted to convict
when only nine votes were necessary to convict)).
284. See generally 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 126, 606[06]; Palmer, Post-Trial
Interview of Jurors in the Federal Courts-A Lawyer's Dilemma, 6 Hous. L. REV. 290 (1968)
(describing severe limitation on lawyer examination of jurors).
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of competency is like trying to eat soup with a fork. Although by proper
manipulation some nourishment can be supplied, the process is hit or miss
with substantial and unacceptable side effects.
The competency rules originally centered on considerations of protecting
the court from suspect testimony, thus adding to the truth-finding function
of the trial.2 85 Although a few remnants of traditional competency rules
remain, the clear trend, which is almost complete now, is to abrogate rules of
competency. 286 The Federal Rules of Evidence follow this trend by substan-
tially liberalizing the law of competency in federal courts, leaving rule 606(b)
as an anomaly.2 87 The policies behind the rule, which are the interest in the
privacy of the deliberations, avoiding juror harassment, and finality, must,
however, be addressed.
The interest in juror privacy is cited as an important consideration in the
proper functioning of the jury and has been relied on as justification for the
limited competency of jurors in post-trial hearings. Jurors must be free to
engage in robust debate without fearing governmental or public reprisals for
the views expressed in the debate.288 The line between the exercise of the
traditional power of juror nullification and contempt of court or violation of
the juror's oath to uphold the law is not at all clear, particularly to lay ju-
rors. If the essential role of the jury is to serve as a check on governmental
tyranny in the exercise of the laws, then the jurors must be free from govern-
ment scrutiny and possible retaliation. Of course if the main concern is ra-
tional decisionmaking, that jurors must act in accordance with their oaths to
return the result that is indicated only from admissible evidence and
straightforward application of the laws, then perhaps we must require more
accountability on the part of the jurors.
The interest in rational decisionmaking does not totally preclude the pro-
tection of confidentiality of juror communications. In other contexts the
protection of the confidentiality of communications is recognized as neces-
sary to the proper functioning of a particular relationship essential to our
society. Thus, communications from clients to lawyers, 289 executive advi-
sors to the President of the United States, 290 or informants to the prosecu-
tor 29 1 or journalists292 are afforded protection by the courts in the form of an
evidentiary privilege. The distinction between privilege and competency,
285. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 61 (E. Cleary 2d ed.
1972).
286. Id. §§ 61-71; 3 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 126, 601[03].
287. FED. R. EvID. 601-606 & 601 advisory committee note.
288. See supra notes 91-103 and accompanying text.
289. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-97 (1981).
290. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-06 (1974) (privilege gave way, however, to
legitimate needs of judicial process).
291. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 58-60 (1957).
292. See Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 713-15 (3d Cir. 1979); Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436-37 (10th Cir. 1977). But see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665 (1972) (absolute privilege denied in criminal trial); Caldero v. Tribune Publishing Co., 98
Idaho 288, 562 P.2d 791 (journalist had no privilege against disclosure of identity of expert
source), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977).
1222 [Vol. 38
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL
however, is substantial. 293 In the first place privileges, which are based on
protection of confidential communications, can be waived if the owner of the
privilege no longer is concerned about maintaining the confidentiality of the
communication. 294 Second, with few exceptions,295 the privilege is generally
not absolute and gives way when the information claimed to be privileged
directly affects a criminal prosecution or the assertion of an accused's consti-
tutional rights.296 Juror privilege, not juror incompetency, should be the
proper vehicle to protect the interest in privacy and confidentiality of juror
deliberations. 297
A second concern is that free availability of juror testimony to impeach
verdicts will encourage harassment and intimidation of jurors. Although the
precise nature of this concern is rarely developed, 298 it appears to be com-
prised of several different notions. First, jurors should not be bothered by
persistent investigators insisting on repeated interviews that may lead to ex-
tended hearings in which the jurors are witnesses or are required to sign
affidavits. 299 Second, clever investigators might take advantage of less clever
lay jurors and plant ideas leading to affidavits or juror testimony shaped
more by the investigator than by the juror witness. 3°° Finally, jurors may be
coerced or bribed into providing false testimony. 30'
Although the concerns might be genuine, and have certainly been consist-
ently expressed by the courts and commentators, they fall short of justifying
293. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 285, §§ 72-73.
294. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43-53 (1980).
295. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974) (state secret privilege might
be absolute); Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retourderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 733 (4th
Cir. 1974) (work product protection for attorney thought processes absolute), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 997 (1975). The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination could be considered
absolute although proper grant of immunity could justify compelling testimony. Kastiger v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443-62 (1972).
296. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707-13 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 679-709 (1972).
297. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
298. The advisory committee note to FED. R. EvID. 606(b) cites Grenz v. Werre, 129
N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1964), in support of this proposition. The submission by the Justice De-
partment to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (see supra notes 134-
35 and accompanying text) cites Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1968), and
United States v. Driscoll, 276 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), as cases supporting the view that
a broad juror incompetency rule is necessary to avoid harassment of jurors by unsuccessful
litigants. Of the three cases noted above, only Miller even arguably involved any post-trial
harassment of jurors. In Grenz all 12 jurors signed affidavits stating that they believed the
defendant not guilty of gross negligence, contrary to their verdict. The opinion includes no
mention of harassment of these jurors. In Driscoll the court enjoined a post-trial investigation
similar to the investigation in Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966). Again nothing in the
opinion indicates juror harassment in this case. In Miller a juror was threatened during the
trial by an unknown person. The arguable post-trial harassment came about when a private
investigator, described by the court as "an attractive petite blonde, twenty-two years old" con-
ducted lengthy wide-ranging interviews with jurors. She made unannounced visits to jurors'
houses and paid a second visit to three jurors who refused to be interviewed.
299. Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1968).
300. In Grenz v. Werre, 129 N.W.2d 681 (N.D. 1964), each of the 12 jurors signed a
separate, but identically worded, affidavit.




the retention of the unique concept of incompetency of juror testimony. In
the first place, the incompetency rule precludes jurors from willingly provid-
ing testimony. The jurors are also free to refuse to talk to investigators and
lawyers. The trial judge should as a matter of course instruct jurors as to
their rights and the juror privilege. 30 2 The exercise of the juror privilege
would ensure that the jurors could not be compelled to talk about the pro-
ceedings absent a court order and judicial determination that the privilege is
inapplicable or has been waived. Lawyers are specifically precluded from
harassing jurors by the enforcement of existing ethical standards. 30 3 Appro-
priate sanctions can be leveled at an attorney who persists in bothering ju-
rors after the juror informs the lawyer of his unwillingness to discuss the
case. If the juror is aware of the right to refuse and still chooses to talk, then
no harassment has occurred.
The process of interviewing jurors after a verdict does not appear to pres-
ent more of an opportunity for unseemly conduct on behalf of the inter-
viewer than the process of interviewing witnesses prior to the trial. In both
cases the interviewer might act improperly and plant suggestions to the un-
wary witness. No one has suggested that lawyers should not interview wit-
nesses. This concern for interviewing jurors reflects an underlying view that
jury verdicts are so fragile that they can be overturned easily by a carefully
worded phrase sworn to by one juror. The types of misconduct or testimony
that would be sufficient to overturn a verdict should be addressed directly as
a matter of substantive or perhaps constitutional policy. An improper ver-
dict should not be artificially protected by procedural or competency rules
that limit the court's access to evidence relevant to the issue of whether the
verdict should be overturned. Finally, since the competency rule has numer-
ous exceptions, and in criminal cases inquiries into constitutional violations
might be appropriate despite the language of the rule, the rule does not elim-
inate the need for the conscientious lawyer to interview jurors to assess
whether the jurors have committed misconduct and whether this particular
type of misconduct is susceptible to juror testimony.
The concern for juror intimidation likewise does not support the incompe-
tency rule. In most cases jurors are no more susceptible to intimidation
when they become a witness at a post-trial hearing than they were as sitting
jurors. A finely drawn competency rule is also unlikely to influence the mis-
creant who is set on threatening a juror. Arguably, a criminally accused
might be reluctant to make a threat to a juror prior to a verdict for fear that
the juror might react adversely to the accused. After the verdict, presuma-
302. Part of the court's concern in Miller was that "[a] juror so interviewed often does not
know what he is supposed to do or supposed not to do." 403 F.2d at 82. The trial judge
should fully instruct jurors about their rights so they are not placed in this situation.
303. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-108(D), which still
serves as the model for state ethical codes. Disciplinary Rule 7-108(D) states:
After the discharge of the jury from further consideration of a case with which
the lawyer was connected, the lawyer shall not ask questions of or make com-
ments to a member of that jury that are calculated merely to harass or embar-
rass the juror or to influence his actions in future jury service.
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bly the now convicted individual might believe that he has less to lose by
threatening a juror. Developing a rule of competency applicable in all cases
to guard against this one possibility of abuse, however, is not warranted. All
participants in the prosecution of a criminal case, including the prosecutors,
the judge, the investigators, and the witnesses, may be targets for threats.
An additional concern is the public pressure or ostracism that jurors
might feel if the public is appraised of their expressed views or misconduct in
a controversial case. The competency rule, however, is not a rule of se-
crecy 3°4 that precludes jurors from talking about their deliberations; it pre-
cludes only their testimony. Courts have been unwilling to enjoin journalists
from interviewing jurors and publishing the interviews since the public has
an interest in the trial proceedings. 305  The public cannot be totally pre-
cluded from the voir dire, 306 and the return of the verdict and polling of the
jury is a public act. The rule of competency does not protect jurors from
public attention.
The interest in finality is the most substantial concern prompting the his-
toric rule that limits juror testimony about the deliberations and verdict.
The unspoken assumption is that a close inquiry into how the jury reached
its verdict will frequently reveal impropriety. The stated assumption upon
which our jury trial system is based, however, is that the jurors will act
properly. 30 7 We instruct the jury about the presumption of innocence and
the burden of proof; that they are not to draw an inference from the fact that
the accused did not testify; that evidence of past criminal convictions of the
accused is offered only on the issue of credibility and should not be consid-
ered in determining whether the accused committed the crime with which he
is charged; or that the testimony ruled inadmissible by the judge should not
be considered by the jury. Although we must assume that the jury correctly
abided by the instructions, few believe that jurors always do. To disprove
our assumption would be to disprove the validity of the trial process upon
which we rely for dispute resolution in the United States. We therefore ig-
nore the fallacy of our assumption and block the avenue of proof to those
few individuals who foolishly attempt to disprove our assumption. The
great wealth of social science data providing an empirical basis for disprov-
ing our assumptions, the recent trend toward recognizing that the accused's
constitutional rights extend to the jury decisionmaking process, and the
Supreme Court's recent reliance on post-trial juror testimony all require a
reevaluation of the central role of the jury in criminal cases as guaranteed by
the Constitution.
304. Senator McClellan raised the possibility of providing the same cloak of secrecy around
petit juries that now protects the grand jury. See supra note 135.
305. United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978).
306. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S. Ct. 819, 821-25, 78 L. Ed. 2d 629, 634-
40 (1984).
307. See, e.g., DeWitt v. Brown, 669 F.2d 516, 523 (8th Cir. 1982); Madrid v. Mine Safety




VII. JURY TRIAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION
The view expressed by the Supreme Court that "[n]o right ranks higher
than the right of the accused to a fair trial" 30 8 must be reconciled with the
historic rule limiting the accused's access to relevant proof that his trial was
tainted by juror misconduct or impropriety. This reconciliation must focus
on defining or redefining the essential nature of the jury trial rights in the
American trial process. If the essential feature of the jury trial is a search for
the truth, based on rational and proper decisionmaking, then the interest in
finality must give way when the jury's decision appears to be tainted in part
by improper considerations or impropriety in the decisionmaking process.
Substantial post-trial litigation focusing on the activities and deliberations of
the jurors would be necessary to ensure that this constitutional right of the
accused was not violated. Based on the empirical data and a review of the
numerous cases in which some type of jury misconduct is documented, this
approach would likely result in the discovery of impropriety or misconduct
in a large number of cases. To restrict the possibility of misconduct and
thereby reduce the number of new trials that might result, courts will have
to give jurors better training, instructions, and perhaps even closer
supervision.
The more traditional and workable concept of the constitutional role of
the jury is to view it as an exercise in democratic decisionmaking. Initially,
an accused is entitled to be judged by peers who are fair and impartial. 30 9
These peers should be permitted to decide the case free from undue govern-
ment influence. 3 10 How or why a jury reached a particular decision is irrele-
vant from a constitutional perspective as long as the jurors were free from
government influence and the parties had an equal opportunity in the adver-
sary process. The latter requires the opportunity to engage in meaningful
voir dire, the presentation of evidence, and confrontation and cross-examina-
tion of government witnesses. From a constitutional perspective, the way
that the jurors reached the decision is of no consequence; they could have
flipped a coin; used inadmissible or improper considerations, improper
preconceptions, bias, or false logic; misunderstood the instructions; or used
independent research or a newspaper article. 31' The key consideration
should be whether the defendant received a fair opportunity to present his
case to a group of lay persons who were properly selected and screened for
bias and who were free to decide the case unfettered by improper govern-
ment influence or outside coercion.
308. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 104 S. Ct. 819, 823, 78 L. Ed. 2d 629, 637
(1984).
309. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 514 (1968).
310. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).
311. As a matter of substantive nonconstitutional law, states and federal courts should be
free to implement or maintain a policy making this type of jury misconduct grounds for a new
trial. A juror's exposure to an occasional newspaper article should be distinguished from the
extreme case in which the publicity accompanying the trial has such an impact on the trial
process as to violate the accused's right to due process. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,
350 (1966).
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Improper conduct by government officials that might have the result of
influencing the jury would be the most serious misconduct. Not every casual
conversation between a court official and a juror, however, need result in a
mistrial or reversal. As the Rushen Court pointed out, jurors and judges
might have numerous conversations on a day-to-day basis about minor ad-
ministrative matters unrelated to the issues in the case. In the Parker type of
case, in which a bailiff makes statements to jurors reflecting directly on the
guilt of an accused, the conviction should, however, not stand. The decision
should be reversed even if an abundance of independent evidence could have
led the jury, and does lead the appellate court, to conclude that the defend-
ant is guilty. Even a guilty person is entitled to the basic rudiments of a fair
trial, including the right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury unfettered by
improper government intervention. The inquiry should not be whether this
improper contact actually had an impact on the jurors' deliberations or deci-
sion, but whether government conduct of this type is inconsistent with the
view of the jury trial rights expressed in the Constitution.
The issue in Remmer similarly would not center on whether individual
jurors can articulate the extent to which they believe that FBI investigations
cast a chill over their discussions and played a part in their decision to con-
vict. The issue should be phrased in terms of whether our fundamental no-
tion of trial by jury as a check against government tyranny was impaired by
the FBI investigation of jurors. In Rushen the trial judge's ex parte confer-
ence with the juror was not the real concern, although the communication
constituted the error that the Supreme Court addressed on appeal. The real
concern, as pointed out by Justice Stevens, was that the conversations re-
vealed a potential bias that was inconsistent with the juror's voir dire testi-
mony. The majority addressed the issue of whether the denial of the right to
counsel or the right to be present at critical stages was harmless error, but
the real concern should have been whether the defendant was denied his
right to a fair and impartial jury. In looking for harmless error, the Court
engaged in metaphysics at a constitutional level and attempted to ascertain
whether the juror's improper contacts or childhood recollections of Black
Panther violence colored her subjective decision in the case. The true consti-
tutional issue is whether a person who had a friend murdered by a Black
Panther can serve as juror in the murder trial of another Black Panther con-
sistent with the constitutional right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury.
The issue is essentially the same as it would be had the juror answered accu-
rately on voir dire and the judge had refused to dismiss her for cause.
Phillips raised an issue that spans the gap between improper government
intrusion into the jury room and a potentially biased juror. The governmen-
tal misconduct basically included nonfeasance, which was the failure of the
prosecutor to notify the court and the opposing counsel of an improper con-
tact by a juror. In the background of the case it appears that some contact
occurred between a government official, who was a friend of the juror, and
the juror. The Court did not specifically address the implications of this
contact. These facts raise the issue of whether this informal contact by a
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government agent about an unrelated matter and the state's nondisclosure
intrudes on the defendant's right to a jury decision unfettered by government
coercion.
The main issue is raised, not by the government's action, but by the juror
when he applied for the job. The juror's action does not involve a misstate-
ment on voir dire and is of concern only because of the economic position in
which it places the juror during the deliberations of the case. The independ-
ent conduct of a juror after voir dire should ordinarily neither implicate the
defendant's rights to a fair or impartial jury, nor involve government or
outside intrusion into the decisionmaking process. Since the juror applied to
the prosecutor's office, however, and the office was apprised of the juror's
conduct, the state's lack of disclosure becomes critical to the fair trial issue.
The constitutional analysis, however, should not focus on the extent to
which this juror's ultimate decision to convict was based on factors relating
to the job application. The issue basically should be whether the defendant
was deprived of his right to a fair and impartial jury when one of the jurors
applied for a job with the prosecuting attorney.
This approach is precisely the one used by the Court in McDonough Power
Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood.312 In this civil action petitioner claimed that
a juror failed to answer truthfully a voir dire question about whether he or a
member of his family had ever sustained a severe injury. Emphasizing the
need for efficiency, economy, and finality, the Court pointed out that liti-
gants are entitled to a fair trial, but not a perfect trial. 313 In affirming the
decision, the Court set out the following two-tier test:
A party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a
material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct re-
sponse would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. The
motives for concealing information may vary, but only those reasons
that affect a juror's impartiality can truly be said to affect the fairness of
the trial. 314
No showing that the juror was actually biased or that his predisposition
had any impact on the verdict or deliberations is required. The Court cited
Smith v. Phillips without analyzing the opinion, but did not cite Rushen v.
Spain, despite the issue similarities in Greenwood and Rushen. Presumably
in Greenwood a different approach is justified because the criminal constitu-
tional issues addressed in Rushen and Phillips are not implicated. The
Court, however, did discuss whether petitioner received a fair trial in Green-
wood. Although the interest in liberty and the stigma associated with crimi-
nal prosecutions might require some accommodation, the basic rudiments of
a fair trial should be similar in civil and criminal proceedings.
Focusing on the broader issue, rather than on the factual inquiry ascer-
taining why jurors voted the way they did, involves a more traditional appel-
late function. Courts must analyze policies and reconcile numerous
312. 104 S. Ct. 845, 78 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1984).
313. Id. at 848, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 669.
314. Id. at 850, 78 L. Ed. 2d at 671.
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concerns expressed in the Constitution. A broader focus permits the appel-
late courts to address the key substantive issues of the proper role of the jury
in our adversary system and the proper relationship between the federal and
state courts and the appellate and trial courts. Once the appellate courts
develop a clear policy on these issues, this policy can be uniformly and effi-
ciently effectuated by the trial courts. In the end the change will perpetuate
finality of verdicts and a greater public reception of the judicial processes
protecting the basic values giving rise to the constitutional right to jury trial.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), which precludes a convicted defendant
from introducing evidence of juror misconduct on the ground of incompe-
tency, cannot be reconciled with recent Supreme Court decisions recogniz-
ing the accused's constitutional rights in the decisionmaking process of the
jury. The current view of the trial as essentially a truth-finding process and
the emphasis on post-trial hearings of jurors to determine as a factual matter
the actual impact on jurors of any alleged misconduct or error are inconsis-
tent with the policy and language of the federal rule limiting testimony on
these crucial facts. The courts and legislature must engage in a reconcilia-
tion of these competing concerns. To some extent the reconciliation process
has been underway for years with the continuing examination and reexami-
nation of the role of the jury, the voir dire, and the trial process. To resolve
the problems effectively, however, the courts must engage in a comprehen-
sive reevaluation of the essential nature of the jury trial in America. Sub-
stantive rights must be redefined and, once defined, certainly not impaired by
inconsistent procedural rules. Clear distinctions must be made between con-
stitutional rights, binding on the states and cognizable in federal courts, and
other policy or procedural concerns about which the states may make their
own accommodations free from scrutiny of the federal courts. The inquiry
must not only involve an examination of the role of the jury as an isolated
institution, but also in the context of our trial and appellate process. The
examination should address the historical development and role of the jury,
as well as the great wealth of recent empirical data on the workings of the
jury. The interests of juror privacy and finality represented in the eviden-
tiary rule must be considered and accommodated to the extent permitted by
the prevailing view of the jury trial right provided in the Constitution.
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